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Contractual Agreements to Arbitrate
Disputes: Waiver of the Right to
Compel Arbitration
Arbitration' has long served as a dispute resolution mechanism in nu-
merous legal systems.2 Today, arbitration is increasingly utilized as an
alternative to litigation or pre-trial settlement of disputes,3 particularly
in the contractual setting. Agreements to arbitrate are commonly
found in labor, commercial, and personal services contracts.4 They are
especially frequent in contracts for medical services.' Such agreements
are generally favored by the courts because arbitration relieves the con-
gestion in the court system while still enabling justice to be rendered to
the disputing parties.' Under an arbitration agreement, either party
has an enforceable right to compel the other party to arbitrate any con-
tractual dispute covered by the agreement.7
1. Arbitration is a method of private adjudication whereby parties to a contract choose one
or more persons-usually lawyers or businessmen-to decide their contractual disputes. See text
accompanying notes 52-56 infra. Although arbitration is generally thought to have grown out of
Roman law, which did not use professionally trained judges, there is evidence suggesting that
arbitration methods may have been used to resolve disputes as long ago as 3100 B.C. Jalet, Judi-
cialReview ofArbitration: The JudicialAttitude, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 515, 519 & n.2 (1960); Wolaver,
The Historical Background of CommercialArbitration, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 132, 132 (1934). The
roots of arbitration in Anglo-American law have been traced to the Kentish laws of Aethelbehrt in
the seventh century. Note, Enforceability of CommercialAgreements to Arbitrate Future Disputes:
JudicialAlteration of the Florida Arbitration Code, 30 U. FLA. L. REV. 615, 616 & n.10 (1978). For
a description of modem arbitration proceedings, see Menlschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61
COLUM. L. REV. 846, 862-65 (1961).
2. See Jalet, supra note I, at 519; Wolaver, supra note 1, at 132.
3. See Henderson, Contractual Problems in the Enforcement fAgreements to Arbitrate Med-
ical Malpractice, 58 VA. L. REv. 947, 955 (1972); Jones, Arbitration and the Dilemma ofPossible
Error, 35 L.A.B. BULL. 216, 216 (1960). No less an authority than the Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court has stated that "we should encourage. . . the use of private arbitration for
the settlement of private disputes." U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Dec. 14, 1970, at 35 (interview
with Chief Justice Warren Burger).
4. See Henderson, supra note 3, at 947-48, 948 n.4, 958-59.
5. Henderson, supra note 3, at 955-60.
6. Utah Constr. Co. v. Western Pac. R., 174 Cal. 156, 159, 162 P. 631, 632-33 (1916); Coul-
son, Texas Arbitration--Modern Machinery Standing Idle, 25 Sw. L.J. 290, 291 (1971); Henderson,
supra note 3, at 956 n.37; see Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 410
(2d Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 909, cert. dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960); Vernon v. Drexel
Burnham & Co., 52 Cal. App. 3d 706, 715, 125 Cal. Rptr. 147, 152 (1975).
7. See text accompanying notes 44-45 infra.
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As with most contractual rights, the right to arbitrate may be
waived by a party to the contract.8 Explicit waiver is unusual and
presents few difficulties for a court-by definition, an explicit waiver
clearly indicates the waiving party's intention not to invoke the con-
tractually.,sanctioned arbitration mechanism. When waiver of arbitra-
tion rights is allegedly implied, however, courts often have difficulty
deciding whether waiver has actually occurred. For example, a party
to a contract that contains an agreement to arbitrate may file suit on an
arbitrable issue. The defendant then answers the suit by pleading,
among other defenses, the arbitration agreement. The parties take dep-
ositions and exchange interrogatories. Six months later, when the suit
is ready to be calendared for trial, the defendant moves to compel arbi-
tration pursuant to the contractual agreement to arbitrate. Should the
defendant, by his participation in the judicial process and by his delay
in moving for arbitration, be held to have waived his contractual right
to compel arbitration?
The problem can also arise from the plaintiff's conduct. Assume
the same facts as in the previous hypothetical, except that the defendant
answers the plaintiff's complaint on the merits, without pleading the
agreement to arbitrate as a defense. Can the plaintiff then change his
mind, drop the suit, and move to compel arbitration, or should his ini-
tial resort to a judicial forum be viewed as a waiver of his contractual
right to arbitration?
The courts have given no clear answers. Under the old California
standard, the "reasonableness" of the putative waiving party's conduct
in delaying enforcement of his arbitration rights was the crucial issue-
"unreasonable" delay constituted waiver.' The California Supreme
Court, however, has recently rejected this reasonableness standard for
another test--"actual litigation."' 0 Regardless of any unreasonable de-
lay in enforcement, or even conduct presumptively inconsistent with an
8. Gunderson v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. App. 3d 138, 143, 120 Cal. Rptr. 35, 38 (1975),
disapproved on other grounds, Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge, Highway and Transp. Dist., 23 Cal.
3d 180, 188, 588 P.2d 1261, 1265, 151 Cal. Rptr. 837, 841 (1979); see Stewart v. Meyers, 353 F.2d
691, 694 (7th Cir. 1965). See generally 3A A. CoRBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 752-71, at 478-560 (1960).
9. See text accompanying note 111 infra.
10. Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge, Highway and Transp. Dist., 23 Cal. 3d 180, 588 P.2d 1261,
151 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1979) (disapproving the "filing suit" test of waiver articulated in Maddy v.
Castle, 58 Cal. App. 3d 716, 130 Cal. Rptr. 160 (1976); Gunderson v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. App.
3d 138, 120 Cal. Rptr. 35 (1975); Titon Enterprises, Inc. v. Armo Constr. Co., 32 Cal. App. 3d 828,
108 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1973); Schwartz v. Leibel, 249 Cal. App. 2d 761, 57 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1967)).
This case is discussed at text accompanying notes 124-41 infra.
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intent to arbitrate," l implied waiver under this standard cannot occur
until a suit reaches the point of "actual litigation" in the judicial proc-
ess.12 The federal courts offer yet a third test-the presence or absence
of "prejudice." Under this standard, waiver occurs when one party's
intention to arbitrate is ambiguous or misleading, and the other party is
significantly disadvantaged thereby.' 3 Both the California and the fed-
eral courts consider waiver a factual issue to be resolved at trial upon
the individual circumstances of each case.
14
Serious problems exist with all three standards. This Note argues
that these tests tend to subvert the policy goals of arbitration by encour-
aging litigation' 5 and increasing the delay and expense of the arbitra-
tion process. 16 It then argues that these tests conflict with general
principles of contractual waiver.' 7 Finally, this Note proposes a clear
and specific standard conducive to attaining the policy goals of arbitra-
tion and consistent with contract waiver law in general.' 8
I. DEVELOPMENT OF EXISTING ARBITRATION LAW
Current law regarding waiver of the right to compel arbitration is in a
state of confusion. Although the policy goals of arbitration have been
widely and clearly articulated, and the procedures for enforcement of
an arbitration agreement carefully delineated, there is a lack of consen-
sus as to when a party to an arbitration agreement waives the right to
compel arbitration under that agreement.
A. ARBITRATION LAW GENERALLY
Common law courts were traditionally antagonistic toward agreements
to arbitrate and refused to enforce these agreements. Modem courts,
however, are supportive of arbitration, and most states currently have
statutory provisions providing for judicial enforcement of an agree-
ment to arbitrate upon petition by a party to the agreement. Arbitra-
tion is favored by modem courts because it reduces congestion in the
judicial system by providing a fast, adaptable, and inexpensive forum
for parties desiring resolution of a dispute.
11. Both standards rely to a limited extent on judge-made rules whereby waiver is conclu-
sively presumed from specified acts. See notes 108-09 infra.
12. See text accompanying notes 124-41 infra.
13. See text accompanying notes 142-71 infra.
14. See text accompanying note 108 infra.
15. See text accompanying notes 172-85 infra.
16. See text accompanying notes 186-206 infra.
17. See text accompanying notes 207-21 infra.
18. See text accompanying notes 222-54 infra.
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1. The Traditional Common Law View of Arbitration
Under traditional common law doctrine, an arbitration agreement is
not specifically enforceable. 9 This nonenforceability stems from the
judicial doctrine of revocability, first articulated by Lord Coke in a dic-
tum in Vynior's Case:2  "I]f I submit myself to an arbitrament [arbi-
tration] . . . yet I may revoke it, for my act, or my words cannot alter
the judgement of the law to make that irrevocable, which is of its own
nature revocable."'" Later cases used Lord Coke's doctrine of revoca-
bility to deny the specific enforcement of arbitration agreements. 22 Al-
though a remedy for damages may be had for breach or repudiation of
an arbitration agreement, it is grossly inadequate because only nominal
damages are ever awarded.23 In effect, either party to an arbitration
agreement under common law can defeat an attempt by the other party
to arbitrate simply by unilaterally revoking the agreement.24
The common law antagonism to arbitration probably originated
from the loss of income25 and social power by common law judges
when they were ousted from jurisdiction by private, lay arbitration
tribunals.26 The modem judiciary; however, is generally supportive of
19. Henderson, supra note 3, at 948; Wolaver, supra note 1, at 138.
20. 8 Coke 80a, 77 Eng. Rep. 595 (1609).
21. Id. at 82a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 599-600. This case was a debt action upon a bond, brought by
Vynior against the defendant. The question before the court was whether the defendant's revoca-
tion of his consent to an agreement to arbitrate violated a condition of the bond, thus forfeiting its
face amount to Vynior. The court held that the revocation was indeed a violation. Id. at 82b, 77
Eng. Rep. at 600-01. The propriety and legality of the revocation, however, was not disputed by
the parties. See 8 Coke at 80a-81a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 595-97. Lord Coke's language on revocability
was unnecessary to his disposition of the case, Wolaver, supra note 1, at 138-39, and it has been
argued that this dictum directly contradicted law of over two hundred years standing. Comment,
Arbitration andAward." Commercial Arbitration in Caifornia, 17 CALIF. L. REV. 643, 643 (1929).
But see Wolaver, supra note 1, at 138 nA0. For good discussions of the doctrine of revocability
and the deficiencies of Vynior's Case, see Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126
F.2d 978, 982-84 (2d Cir. 1942); Sayre, Development of CommercialArbitration Law, 37 YALE LJ.
595, 598-605 (1928).
22. Wolaver, supra note 1, at 138; Comment, supra note 21, at 643.
23. Henderson, supra note 3, at 949 & n.6.
24. Henderson, supra note 3, at 948; Wolaver, supra note 1, at 138; Comment, JudicialDefer-
ence to Arbitral Determinations: Continuing Problems of Power and Finaliy, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
936, 938 n.14 (1976).
25. Common law judges had no fixed salaries and their fees depended on the volume of
litigation in their respective courts. Wolaver, supra note 1, at 141-42. This same fear of losing
significant work and income may have been at the root of modem judicial and legal opposition to
compulsory arbitration. See Kagel, Labor and CommercialArbitration Under the Cahyarnia Arbi-
tration Statute, 38 CALIF. L. REv. 799, 800-01 & n.9 (1950).
26. Henderson, supra note 3, at 948; Wolaver, supra note 1, at 141-42. For example, the
King's Court did not enforce private contractual agreements made in other courts, 0. W. HOLMES,
THE COMMON LAW 202-03 nn.24 & 28 (M. Howe ed. 1963), because to do so would have impeded
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arbitration, 7 and modem statutes providing for the enforcement of ar-
bitration agreements have largely superseded the common law doctrine
of revocability. Common law arbitration and the doctrine of revocabil-
ity, however, are not totally without significance; they are applicable
whenever deviation from proper form or procedure precludes use of a
relevant enforcement statute.28
2. Modern Arbitration Law
Modem statutory law has been much more supportive of agreements to
arbitrate than the common law. A 1920 New York statute was the first
in a common law jurisdiction to make arbitration agreements irrevoca-
ble and to provide for their enforcement upon the petition of any party
to the agreement.2 9 A comparable federal statute was passed in 1925,30
and California passed an arbitration law closely resembling the New
York statute3' in 1927.32 The statutes provided that a court could,
upon the petition of one of the parties to an arbitration agreement, stay
any action filed in a judicial forum on an arbitrable issue, pending arbi-
tration of that issue. Upon proper motion by one of the parties, the
court could also order the parties to arbitrate any issue arbitrable under
their agreement.33
These statutes did not immediately result in judicial enforcement
the unification of the King's realm and reduced the fees collected for the royal treasury, Sayre,
supra note 21, at 597-98. Similar jurisdictional confrontations occurred between temporal and
ecclesiastical courts during the reign of Henry II, and between the courts of law and equity at the
outset of the sixteenth century. Comment, supra note 24, at 936.
27. See text accompanying notes 29-42 infra.
28. Dickson v. Hoffman, 305 F. Supp. 1040 (D. Kan. 1969) (application of revocability doc-
trine); Henderson, supra note 3, at 950-51.
29. 1920 N.Y. Laws, ch. 275 (current version at N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §§ 7501-7514 (McKin-
ney 1963)); see Feldman, Arbitration Modernized-The New Caifornia Arbitration Act, 34 S. CAL.
L. REV. 413, 414 (1961).
30. Pub. L. No. 66-401, §§ 1-15, 43 Stat. 883, 883-86 (1925) (current version at 9 U.S.C. §§ I-
14 (1976)).
31. See Clogston v. Schiff-Lang Co., 2 Cal. 2d 414,416, 41 P.2d 555, 557 (1935) (per curiam);
Feldman, supra note 29, at 414; Comment, supra note 21, at 645. The California law was modeled
after the New Jersey law which was itself modeled after the New York law. Feldman, supra note
29, at 414.
32. 1927 Cal. Stats., ch. 225 (current version at CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1280-1297 (West
Cum. Supp. 1979)); see Note, Commercial.Arbitration in Calffornia, 15 CALIF. L. REV. 289, 289
(1927). Since 1927, over thirty other states have passed legislation providing for some enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements, Henderson, supra note 3, at 949 n.7; Note, supra note 1, at 617,
and of the remaining states, only Oklahoma and Vermont have no arbitration statutes whatsoever,
id. at 617 n.21.
33. Pub. L. No. 66-401, §§ 3-4, 43 Stat. 883, 883-84 (1925) (current version at 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4
(1976)); 1927 Cal. Stats., ch. 225 (current version at CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1281.2 (West Cum.
Supp. 1979)).
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of agreements to arbitrate. Courts circumvented the enforcement stat-
utes by means of the "no dispute" doctrine enunciated in International
Association of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer;34
It is for the court to determine whether the contract contains a provi-
sion for arbitration of the dispute tendered, and. . . the court must
determine whether this is such a dispute. If the meaning of the provi-
sion sought to be arbitrated is beyond dispute, there cannot be any-
thing to arbitrate and the contract cannot be said to provide for
arbitration.35
In other words, in any dispute covered by an agreement to arbitrate, it
was up to the courts to decide whether a genuine dispute existed and
whether such a dispute was indeed arbitrable under the arbitration
agreement. Because a judicial ruling that a case lacked substantive
merit or was not covered by the arbitration agreement could prevent its
arbitration, the courts, for a time, retained the effect, if not the form, of
the common law revocability doctrine.36 The Cutler-Hammer rule,
however, has been disavowed both judicially37 and legislatively3 in
California and federal jurisdictions. Presently, the federal courts' func-
tion in an action to compel arbitration does not extend beyond deter-
mining whether the party seeking arbitration has made a claim that
appears on its face to be governed by the contract between the parties.39
In California, judges are required to enforce an agreement to arbi-
trate unless the right to compel arbitration has been waived by peti-
tioner, grounds exist for revocation or invalidation of the agreement
(e.g., fraud) or pending, collateral litigation will resolve the issue(s)
sought to be arbitrated.4" Because modern-day courts generally look
very favorably on the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate, 41 courts
34. 271 App. Div. 917, 67 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1946) (per curiam), aff'dmem., 297 N.Y. 519, 74
N.E.2d 464 (1947).
35. 271 App. Div. at 918, 67 N.Y.S.2d at 318.
36. See text accompanying notes 20-24 supra.
37. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566-68 (1960); Posner v. Grun-
wald-Marx, Inc., 56 Cal. 2d 169, 176, 363 P.2d 313, 316, 14 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300 (1961).
38. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1281.2 (West Cum. Supp. 1979); see 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
39. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 501 F.2d 423, 427 (8th Cir. 1974);
Gait v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 376 F.2d 711, 714 (7th Cir. 1967); Aeronaves de Mexico,
S.A. v. Triangular Aviation Serv., Inc., 389 F. Supp. 1388, 1390 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd without
opinion, 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975).
40. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1281.2 (West Cum. Supp. 1979); see Note, supra note 32, at
289.
41. E.g., Seaboard Constr. R.R. v. National Rail Passenger Corp., 554 F.2d 657, 660 (5th
Cir. 1977); Penalver v. Compagnie de Navigation Frutiere, 428 F. Supp. 1070, 1072 (E.D.N.Y.
1977); Lehto v. Underground Constr. Co., 69 Cal. App. 3d 933, 939, 138 Cal. Rptr. 419, 422
(1977); Vernon v. Drexel Burnham & Co., 52 Cal. App. 3d 706, 715, 125 Cal. Rptr. 147, 152
(1975).
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usually try to reach a decision that allows arbitration.42
Judicial action with respect to arbitration is generally restricted to
enforcement of the agreement to arbitrate and the resulting arbitration
award.t3 The agreement may be enforced by an order to arbitrate,
which forces a party to pursue or defend his claim at arbitration rather
than in court.' This order also requires that the parties to the dispute
participate in the arbitration process and not impede its progress; fail-
ure to do so would risk a default judgment.
An order to arbitrate is not directly appealable because it is an
interlocutory decree.46 The rationale for nonappealability is that in-
creased delay and expense in the arbitration process would inevitably
result if the defendant in the dispute could litigate every intermediate
ruling;47 the delays, costs, and other disadvantages of litigation are pre-
cisely what arbitration is designed to avoid.48 Although an order com-
pelling arbitration is nonappealable, upon final judgment confirming
the award49 the party compelled to arbitrate is entitled to judicial re-
view of the order to arbitrate."0 The unavailability of immediate chal-
lenge to an order to arbitrate works no hardship on the party who
42. Gavlik Constr. Co. v. H.F. Campbell Co., 526 F.2d 777, 783 (3d Cir. 1975) ("waiver is
not to be lightly inferred"); Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge, Highway and Transp. Dist., 23 Cal. 3d
180, 189, 588 P.2d 1261, 1266, 151 Cal. Rptr. 837, 843 (1979) ("Because arbitration is a highly
favored means of settling such disputes, the courts have been admonished to 'closely scrutinize
any allegation of waiver of such favored right' and to 'indulge every intendment to give effect to
such proceedings' ") (citations omitted).
43. McRae v. Superior Court, 221 Cal. App. 2d 166, 170, 34 Cal. Rptr. 346, 348 (1963).
44. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1976); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1281.2 (West Cum. Supp. 1979); see, e.g.,
Zimmerman v. Cohen, 236 N.Y. 15, 17, 139 N.E. 764, 765 (1923); Feldman, supra note 29, at 423.
45. See Feldman, Arbitration Law in California: Private Tribunalsfor Private Government, 30
S. CAL. L. REV. 414, 435 (1957).
46. Aerojet-General Corp. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 478 F.2d 248, 251 (9th Cir. 1973);
In re Pahlberg Petition, 131 F.2d 968, 969 (2d Cir. 1942); Sjoberg v. Hastorf, 33 Cal. 2d 116, 119,
199 P.2d 668, 670 (1948); Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 63 Cal. App. 3d 345, 353, 133 Cal. Rptr.
775, 780-81 (1976); Maddy v. Castle, 58 Cal. App. 3d 716, 719, 130 Cal. Rptr. 160, 161 (1976),
disapproved on other grounds, Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge, Highway and Transp. Dist., 23 Cal.
3d 180, 188, 588 P.2d 1261, 1265, 151 Cal. Rptr. 837, 841 (1979); see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§ 1294
(West 1972).
47. Aerojet-General v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 478 F.2d 248, 251 (9th Cir. 1973);
Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 63 Cal. App. 3d 345, 353, 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 780-81 (1976).
48. Gulf Cent. Pipeline Co. v. Motor Vessel Lake Placid, 315 F. Supp. 974, 977 (E.D. La.
1970); see text accompanying notes 64-91 infra.
49. An arbitration award that has not been confirmed or vacated has the force and effect of a
written contract between the parties. Jones v. Kvistad, 19 Cal. App. 3d 836, 840, 97 Cal. Rptr. 100,
103 (1971). An award acquires the force of a judgment upon confirmation. Id.
50. Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 63 Cal. App. 3d 345, 353, 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 780-81 (1976);
Maddy v. Castle, 58 Cal. App. 3d 716, 719, 130 Cal. Rptr. 160, 161 (1976), disapproved on other
grounds, Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge, Highway and Transp. Dist., 23 Cal. 3d 180, 188, 588 P.2d
1979] 1519
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:1513
wishes to avoid arbitration; he may win the dispute at arbitration, and
even if he does not, he may still attack the order upon confirmation of
the award.5'
The selection of the arbitrator is the most crucial phase of the arbi-
tration process because it is the arbitrator who renders final judgment
on the substantive merits of the dispute, and because judicial review of
that judgment is severely limited.5 2 The selection process is almost al-
ways specified in the agreement to arbitrate. One practice in commer-
cial arbitration is for the parties to designate in their agreement an
arbitration agency, such as the American Arbitration Association, that
will choose the arbitrator if the agreement is invoked.53 Alternatively,
parties often opt for the formation of a "tripartite tribunal"--each
party appoints his own arbitrator, and the two appointees select a
third.54 The tripartite tribunal has the advantage of ensuring that each
party has an advocate in the decisionmaking process.55 When the two
appointed arbitrators cannot agree on a third arbitrator, or when the
contract does not provide for a specific selection process, most state
enforcement statutes provide for court appointment of the third arbi-
trator.5
6
The arbitration award itself is appealable only on narrow grounds.
Statutorily, an award may be vacated only when there exists fraud or
corruption in obtaining the award; corruption of any of the arbitrators;
misconduct by the arbitrators that prejudiced the rights of any party; or
when the arbitrators exceed their power.5 7 Case law has further limited
the scope of appeal. The findings of an arbitrator have been held to be
conclusive as to both law and fact;5" neither the merits of a dispute, 59
1261, 1265, 151 Cal. Rptr. 837, 841 (1979); Wetsel v. Garibaldi, 159 Cal. App. 2d 4, 8, 323 P.2d
524, 527 (1958).
51. Maddy v. Castle, 58 Cal. App. 3d 716, 719-20, 130 Cal. Rptr. 160, 161-62 (1976), drap-
proved on oiher grounds, Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge, Highway and Transp. Dist., 23 Cal. 3d
180, 188, 588 P.2d 1261, 1265, 151 Cal. Rptr. 837, 841 (1979).
52. See text accompanying notes 57-63 infra.
53. M. DOMKE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 20.01, at 189.90
(1968).
54. Id. § 20.03, at 197; L. MAYERS, THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 552 (rev. ed. 1964).
55. M. DOMKE, supra note 58, § 20.03, at 197.
56. Id. § 20.02, at 195-96, § 20.04, at 201; e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1976); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE
§ 1281.6 (West 1972). For a general elucidation of the actual process of an arbitration, see L.
MAYERS, supra note 54, at 553-55.
57. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1976); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1286.2 (West 1972).
58. Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. United Steelworkers, 263 F. Supp. 488, 493 (C.D. Cal. 1967);
General Constr. Co. v. Herring Realty Co., 201 F. Supp. 487, 491 (E.D.S.C. 1962), appeal dis-
missed, 312 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1963); Safeway Stores v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 83 Cal. App.
3d 430, 437, 147 Cal. Rptr. 835, 838-39 (1978).
59. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960); Harvey
1520
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the credibility of the parties, 60 nor the sufficiency of the evidence sup-
porting an award6 is a proper subject for review. Moreover, an award
is not invalidated either by an arbitrator's erroneous legal reasoning,62
or his failure to state any reasoning at all.63
3. Policy Goals of Arbitration
One of the most important purposes of arbitration law is to provide
disputants with a speedy alternative to litigation; 64 disputes are gener-
ally resolved more quickly if arbitrated rather than litigated in the judi-
cial system. 65 Because arbitrating parties need not cope with hopelessly
crowded court calendars,66 they can avoid the long delay that inevita-
bly accompanies litigation.67 In addition, arbitrators are usually more
Aluminum, Inc. v. United Steelworkers, 263 F. Supp. 488, 493 (C.D. Cal. 1967); Safeway Stores v.
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 83 Cal. App. 3d 430, 437, 147 Cal. Rptr. 835, 838-39 (1978); Horn v.
Gurewitz, 261 Cal. App. 2d 255, 261, 67 Cal. Rptr. 791, 796 (1968).
60. Pacific Vegetable Corp. v. C.S.T., Ltd., 29 Cal. 2d 228, 238, 174 P.2d 441, 448 (1946).
61. Id.; Safeway Stores v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 83 Cal. App. 3d 430, 437, 147 Cal.
Rptr. 835, 838-39 (1978); Horn v. Gurewitz, 261 Cal. App. 2d 255, 261, 67 Cal. Rptr. 791, 796
(1968).
62. Raytheon Co. v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 322 F.2d 173, 182-83 (9th Cir. 1963); Grunwald-Marx,
Inc. v. Los Angeles Joint Bd., Amal. Clothing Workers, 52 Cal. 2d 568, 589, 343 P.2d 23, 35 (1959);
Safeway Stores v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 83 Cal. App. 3d 430, 437, 149 Cal. Rptr. 835, 838-39
(1978); see note 76 and accompanying text infra.
63. Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238, 244 n.4 (1962): Pacific Vegetable Oil v.
C.S.T., Ltd., 29 Cal. 2d 228, 232, 174 P.2d 441, 441 (1946); Lauria v. Soriano, 180 Cal. App. 2d
163, 168, 4 Cal. Rptr. 328, 331 (1960); see note 76 and accompanying text in ra.
64. Radiator Specialty Co. v. Cannon Mills, Inc., 97 F.2d 318, 319 (4th Cir. 1938); Utah
Constr. Co. v. Western Pac. Ry., 174 Cal. 156, 159, 162 P. 631, 632-33 (1916); Vernon v. Drexel
Burnham & Co., 52 Cal. App. 3d 706, 715, 125 Cal. Rptr. 147, 152 (1975).
65. Vernon v. Drexel Burnham & Co., 52 Cal. App. 3d 706, 715, 125 Cal. Rptr. 147, 152
(1975); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 137, 140, 110 Cal. Rptr. 622, 624
(1973), disapprovedon other grounds, Freeman v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 14 Cal. 3d 473,
486, 535 P.2d 341, 349, 121 Cal. Rptr. 477, 485 (1975); The Biannual Survey ofNew York Practice."
Part 111, 39 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 181, 241 (1964); Note, Compulsory Arbitration to Relieve Trial
Calendar Congestion, 8 STAN. L. REV. 410, 418-19 (1956); see Note, supra note 32, at 294.
66. Waits of five years or longer for trial are not uncommon for certain types of cases. J.
COUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL, & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 771 (2d ed.
1974). Of all civil jury cases tried in the superior courts of California during June 1977, delay
from complaint to trial ranged from five to thirty-two months; fifteen of the twenty superior court
districts had delays in excess of ten months. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, ANNUAL RE-
PORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE-PART I, at 94 (1978). The delay in federal
district court averages nine months. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 96 (1977). In one study of medical malpractice litigation, ten percent
of the jury trials studied were still pending after seven years. Note, California Medical Malpractice
Arbitration and Wrongful Death Actions, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 401, 409 n.48 (1978).
67. Vernon v. Drexel Burnham & Co., 52 Cal. App. 3d 706, 715, 125 Cal. Rptr. 147, 152
(1975); Allstate Ins. v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 137, 140, 110 Cal. Rptr. 622, 624 (1973),
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experienced68 in the particular area of contention than is the average
judge or jury,69 meaning that far less time need be spent by the parties
helping the trier of fact to understand complicated issues and special-
ized evidence and testimony."0 Finally, the informal process of arbitra-
tion, particularly the absence of strict procedural and evidentiary
constraints,7 ' facilitates expeditious resolution of disputes. 2
A second purpose of arbitration law is to provide disputing parties
with a forum that is more adaptable to their specific needs than is the
court system.73 The judicial system is constrained by a broad range of
legal and social values that may prevent individualized judicial consid-
eration of the unique demands and aspects of parties in a business rela-
tionship.74 Every judge must consider not only the effect of his decision
on the case at hand, but also its effect on prior and subsequent case
law.75 The arbitrator, however, is neither bound by strict legal doctrine
disapprovedon other grounds, Freeman v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 14 Cal. 3d 473, 486, 535
P.2d 341, 349, 121 Cal Rptr. 477, 485 (1975); Note, supra note 65, at 410-11, 419.
68. Note, supra note 32, at 294-95.
69. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960); Davey,
The Supreme Court andArbitration: The Musings of an Arbitrator, 36 NOTRE DAME LAW. 138,
139 (1961); Jones, supra note 3, at 218; see Henderson, supra note 3, at 997; Jalet, supra note 1, at
521 n.15. But see Davey, supra at 140 ("Arbitrators . . . cannot fail to be impressed with the
respect which the [Supreme] Court manifests for the superior knowledge, ability and wisdom of
arbitrators, which the court feels apparently cannot be equalled by the 'ablest judge'. ... [S]uch
unstinted praise is in many cases probably not deserved") (citation omitted).
70. Note, supra note 32, at 295.
71. Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. v. C.S.T., Ltd., 29 Cal. 2d 228, 241, 174 P.2d 441,449 (1946);
Horn v. Gurewitz, 261 Cal. App. 2d 255, 262, 67 Cal. Rptr. 791, 796 (1968); Note, supra note 65, at
419. For example, exclusionary rules of evidence, which do not apply in arbitration, make it more
difficult for the parties to prove factual propositions. Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction
and Two Models ofCriminalProcedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 506, 520 (1973).
72. See East San Bernardino Water Dist. v. City of San Bernardino, 33 Cal. App. 3d 942,
950-51, 109 Cal. Rptr. 510, 515-16 (1973); Note, supra note 65, at 419; cf. Damaska, supra note 71,
at 551, 563-64 (discussing the highly technical nature of adversary proceedings in continental and
common law criminal justice systems). Such expeditiousness, however, is not without its costs.
The procedural and evidentiary constraints of the judicial process exist to protect defendants and
ensure the integrity of the judicial process. The absence of such constraints may leave the arbitra-
tion process more susceptible to unfairness and bias. Presumably, parties to an arbitration agree-
ment find that the speed and other advantages of arbitration outweigh the dangers inherent in the
elimination of some procedural and evidentiary protections.
73. Note, supra note 32, at 295; see Jones, supra note 3, at 216.
74. See Note, supra note 32, at 293. For example, in common law systems, truth-seeking
and reliability values are routinely sacrificed in favor of such social values as human dignity,
privacy, and preservation of an atmosphere of freedom. Damaska, supra note 7 1, at 578-87. The
operation of the exclusionary rule on evidence obtained in unconstitutional searches and seizures
is a good example of the weight accorded this latter set of values.
75. This is not to minimize the value of precedential constraints; they guard against caprice
and arbitrariness on the part of the trier of fact, and aid in predicting litigation outcomes. Never-
theless, because the judicial decision is the outcome of so many factors not directly related to the
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nor by precedent.76 Thus, he can freely consider the particular eco-
nomic, ethical, and practical attributes of a dispute without concern for
consistency with precedent or application of his decision in subsequent
cases. Because traditional rules of evidence do not control, the intro-
duction of highly probative books, records, and other writings that
would normally be excluded at trial by the hearsay and best evidence
rules is permitted.77 Arbitration also allows an attorney to follow a
case to its logical place of hearing without regard to jurisdictional
boundaries, local rules of practice, or requirements of state bar mem-
bership.78
Arbitration is also particularly conducive to common business
needs. Because arbitration proceedings are not matters of public rec-
ord, arbitration enables a party to avoid the loss of business customers
and trade secrets, and other damage that may accompany the extensive
and often adverse publicity of a public trial.79 Moreover, arbitration is
a convenient and relatively painless method of enforcing contractual
obligations.8" Because arbitration is less adversarial than litigation, it is
easier to resolve a contractual dispute in arbitration without irreparably
damaging valuable commercial relationships.8'
Finally, arbitration is far less costly than litigation. Out-of-pocket
merits of the dispute at hand, the parameters of any decision are greatly expanded, and litigation
is often considered a greater business risk than arbitration. See generally Note, supra note 32, at
294.
76. Wetsel v. Garibaldi, 159 Cal. App. 2d 4, 12-13, 323 P.2d 524, 530 (1958); Wolaver, supra
note 1, at 132; see Aerojet-General Corp. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 478 F.2d 248, 252 (9th
Cir. 1973); Horn v. Gurewitz, 261 Cal. App. 2d 255, 262, 67 Cal. Rptr. 791, 796; Henderson, supra
note 3, at 967; Note, supra note 32, at 295. Arbitrators are not required to give reasons for their
decisions, Lauria v. Soriano, 180 Cal. App. 2d 163, 168, 4 Cal. Rptr. 328, 331 (1960), and "errone-
ous reasoning will not invalidate an otherwise proper award," Grunwald-Marx, Inc. v. Los Ange-
les Joint Bd., Amal. Clothing Workers, 52 Cal. 2d 568, 589, 343 P.2d 23, 35 (1959).
77. See note 71 and accompanying text supra. For a detailed description of the proof
problems that these evidentary rules create for the commercial litigant, see Sturges, Commercial
Arbitration or Court Application of Common Law Rules of Marketing?, 34 YALE L.J. 480, 485-89
(1925).
78. Coulson, supra note 6, at 292. Although a client does not expect the services of his
attorney to be affected by territorial boundaries, when a court case crosses jurisdictional lines, a
local attorney must often be retained to avoid violation of state bar regulations and local rules of
court practice. Id. at 291-92. In a complex legal area, a mere difference in the substantive law of
two jurisdictions may require the services of a local attorney.
79. Note, supra note 32, at 295; Note, supra note 66, at 413; see Coulson, supra note 6, at 291.
But see also Jones, supra note 3, at 232-33. Such lack of publicity may be just as valuable to non-
business plaintiffs, such as public figures. To the extent that the spectre of trial publicity deters
socially undesirable conduct, however, elimination of such publicity is disadvantageous to the
legal process. See generally O.W. HOLMES, supra note 26, at 40.
80. Coulson, supra note 6, at 291.
81. Note, supra note 32, at 293-294. Of course, when personal association looms large in the
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administrative and legal costs to the disputants are substantially less in
arbitration than in litigation, principally because many expensive court
formalities are eliminated.82 Arbitration is also less expensive because
it takes less time. 3 To the injured plaintiff seeking redress, the costs of
delay can be considerable, 4 including loss of evidence; 5 loss of wit-
nesses' testimony through death, relocation, or fading memory;8 6 delay
of compensation or reimbursement for loss of income or needed medi-
cal care; 7 a risk of business or personal insolvency for lack of timely
redress, as well as a risk of no recovery should the defendant become
insolvent; 8 and forced acceptance of an inequitable settlement because
of financial inability to wait for trial.8 9
Although arbitration is not without its disadvantages, 90 it does re-
sult in significant social savings. Arbitration operates with much less
governmental support than does the judicial system. The parties them-
selves bear all the costs, and most arbitration cases never enter the judi-
cial system.9' Moreover, to the extent that injured persons are deterred
from pressing valid claims by the costs of litigation, social costs are
generated in the form of disaffection with the legal system. Arbitration
is a relatively inexpensive remedy for persons who might otherwise fail
to seek redress.92
contractual relation, as with certain professional services contracts involving doctor-patient or at-
torney-client relationships, preservation of the relationship is unlikely even with arbitration.
82. Discovery proceedings, the production of transcripts, and the necessity of obtaining ex-
pert witnesses are among the court formalities eliminated in arbitration. Note, supra note 66, at
409-10. But see also Note, supra note 32, at 295-96.
83. Henderson, supra note 4, at 947; Note, supra note 32, at 295-96.
84. "[D]elay of justice is itself injustice." Gulf Cent. Pipeline Co. v. Motor Vessel Lake
Placid, 315 F. Supp. 974, 977 (E.D. La. 1970); Note, supra note 65, at 410. Because it takes some
minimum amount of time to adequately prepare any case for adjudication, however, some interval
of delay is optimal. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.10, at 456 (2d ed. 1977). For a
complete description of the difficulties that judicial delay creates for the commercial litigant, see
Sturges, supra note 77, at 481-84.
85. Note, supra note 32, at 295.
86. Id.; Note, Trial Calendar Advancement, 6 STAN. L. REv. 323, 323-24 (1954).
87. Note, supra note 86, at 324.
88. Id.; see Note, supra note 32, at 294.
89. R. POSNER, supra note 84, § 21.8, at 447-48; Note, supra note 65, at 410; see, e.g., Hen-
derson, supra note 3, at 955 n.33 (quoting AR3. NEws, Mar.-Apr. 1972, at 4).
90. See notes 72, 75, 79, 84 supra.
91. Coulson, supra note 7, at 291.
92. Note, supra note 65, at 410; e.g., Note, supra note 66, at 410-11. But see Spence v. Omni-
bus Indus., 44 Cal. App. 3d 970, 976-77, 119 Cal. Rptr. 171, 174 (1975). Contingent fees may
mitigate this deterrent effect but they do not eliminate it. The percentage of recovery that an
attorney takes as his fee under a contingent arrangement reflects not only a charge for services
rendered in the case at hand but also includes a premium that covers the cost of the attorney's
uncompensated legal services in unsuccessful cases; in other words, successful contingent fee plain-
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B. WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
The courts have long held that like other contractual rights, the right to
compel arbitration may be waived.93 Such waiver may be implicit as
well as explicit.94 Waiver is implied from inaction or delay in enforc-
ing the right to arbitrate,95 subject to certain tests such as reasonable-
ness,96 prejudice,97 or actual litigation.98  Thus, a party entitled to
arbitration must take timely affirmative steps to enforce the agreement
to arbitrate or risk being found to have waived by default the right to
arbitrate.99
tiffs pay the legal fees not only for their own cases but also for those of unsuccessful contingent fee
plaintiffs. R. POSNER, supra note 84, § 21.8, at 448-49. Moreover, even if legal services were
costless, plaintiffs' time and inconvenience during litigation would still go uncompensated. Id. at
451; Note, supra note 66, at 411. Finally, the plaintiff with a relatively small claim that cannot be
handled on a contingent fee basis may have trouble finding a lawyer to represent him in court.
Note, sitpra note 66, at 410-11 n.60 ("23% of claims rejected by lawyers were rejected because the
potential dollar settlements were too small"). Therefore, even under a contingent fee arrange-
ment, the expected costs of litigation may often outweigh expected benefits to a potential plaintiff,
thereby deterring him from pressing a valid claim. See R. POSNEP, supra note 84, § 21.8, at 451.
93. Shinto Shipping Co. v. Fibrex & Shipping Co., 572 F.2d 1328, 1330 (9th Cir. 1978);
Morales Rivera v. Sea Land of Puerto Rico, Inc., 418 F.2d 725, 726 (1st Cir. 1969); Cornell & Co.
v. Barber & Ross Co., 360 F.2d 512, 513 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Sawday v. Vista Irrigation Dist., 64 Cal.
2d 833, 836, 415 P.2d 816, 818, 52 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (1966); Landreth v. South Coast Rock Co., 136
Cal. App. 457, 461, 29 P.2d 225, 226-27 (1934). Factors that have been viewed as significant in
determining whether waiver has occurred include failure to pursue arbitration remedies, Charles
J. Rounds Co. v. Joint Council of Teamsters No. 42, 4 Cal. 3d 888, 484 P.2d 1397, 95 Cal. Rptr. 53
(1971); excessive delay in asserting arbitration rights, Sawday v. Vista Irrigation Dist., 64 Cal. 2d
833, 415 P.2d 189, (1966); failure to plead the arbitration agreement in one's answer, Local 659,
I.A.T.S.E. v. Color Corp. of America, 47 Cal. 2d 189, 302 P.2d 294 (1956); filing a counterclaim to
an action filed in a judicial forum, Case v. Kadota Fig Ass'n, 35 Cal. 2d 596, 220 P.2d 912 (1950);
filing suit in a judicial forum, Maddy v. Castle, 58 Cal. App. 3d 716, 130 Cal. Rptr. 160 (1976),
disapproved, Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge, Highway and Transp. Dist., 23 Cal. 3d 180, 188, 588
P.2d 1261, 1265, 151 Cal. Rptr. 837, 841 (1979); failure to designate an arbitrator after having
demanded arbitration, Gunderson v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. App. 3d 138, 120 Cal. Rptr. 35
(1975), disapproved, Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge, Highway and Transp. Dist., 23 Cal. 3d 180,
188, 588 P.2d 1261, 1265, 151 Cal. Rptr. 837, 841 (1979); and failure to request arbitration until 24
hours before trial, Pneucrete Corp. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 7 Cal. App. 2d 733, 56
P.2d 1000 (1935).
94. See Stewart v. Meyers, 353 F.2d 691, 694 (7th Cir. 1965). See general , 3A A. CORBIN,
supra note 8, §§ 752-771, at 478-560.
95. Romnes v. Bache & Co., 439 F. Supp. 833, 839 (W.D. Wis. 1977); Sucrest Corp v. Chimo
Shipping, Ltd., 236 F. Supp. 229, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Sawday v. Vista Irrigation Dist., 64 Cal. 2d
833, 836, 415 P.2d 816, 818, 52 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (1966). For a clear case of waiver by delay, see
McKeeby v. Arthur, 7 N.J. 174, 81 A.2d 1 (1951).
96. See text accompanying notes 111-23 infra.
97. See text accompanying notes 142-71 infra.
98. See text accompanying notes 124-41 infra.
99. Yench v. Stockmar, 483 F.2d 820, 823 (10th Cir. 1973); Martin v. Boulger Destructor
Co., 221 F.2d 218, 221 (2d Cir. 1955); Romes v. Bache & Co., 439 F. Supp. 833, 839 (W.D. Wis.
1977); Charles J. Rounds Co. v. Joint Council of Teamsters No. 42, 4 Cal. 3d 888, 899, 484 P.2d
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Implied waiver by delay or inaction is premised on the nonself-
executing nature of an arbitration agreement; such an agreement does
not automatically prevent a court from exercising jurisdiction over con-
tractual disputes, nor is an injured party automatically entitled to relief
upon its breach."° An agreement to arbitrate is construed by the courts
as a choice of forum mechanism, whereby the party seeking redress
chooses between arbitration and litigation. When a judicial forum is
chosen, the opposing party has the option of acquiescing in the choice,
or acting to bring about arbitration: 10'
[W]here a suit [is] pending involving a contract containing an arbi-
tration agreement, and the defendant [makes] no request or applica-
tion to the c6urt to stay the action pending such arbitration, he
waiv[es] his right to demand such a proceeding, and submit[s] to the
jurisdiction of the court. . . [Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 1284] does not
by its terms intend to deprive the superior court of jurisdiction. ....
but merely to provide a summary means by which the arbitration
agreement may be enforced should one of the parties desire to rely
upon it. It would seem to be the right of the party to invoke this
summary power which would be waived f he did not avail himself of
it. 1
0 2
Thus, the courts must order arbitration only when the parties have
signed an agreement to arbitrate that covers the dispute sought to be
resolved, 0 3 and one of the parties acts to compel use of the arbitration
forum. 
104
1397, 1404, 95 Cal. Rptr. 53, 60 (1971); Landreth v. South Coast Rock Co., 136 Cal. App. 457, 461-
62, 29 P.2d 225, 226 (1934).
100. Ross v. Blanchard, 251 Cal. App. 2d 739, 742, 59 Cal. Rptr. 783, 785 (1967); Landreth v.
South Coast Rock Co., 136 Cal. App. 457, 461-62, 29 P.2d 225, 226 (1934); McKeeby v. Arthur, 7
N.J. 174, 180-81, 81 A.2d 1, 4 (1951); see Charles J. Rounds Co. v. Joint Council of Teamsters No.
42, 4 Cal. 3d 888, 899 & n.l, 484 P.2d 1397, 1404 & n.l, 95 Cal. Rptr. 53, 60 & n.l (1971); text
accompanying note 103 infra.
101. Gallion Iron Works & Mfg. Co. v. J.D. Adams Mfg. Co., 128 F.2d 411, 413 (7th Cir.
1942); Radiator Specialty Co. v. Cannon Mills, Inc., 97 F.2d 318, 319 (4th Cir. 1938); Sucrest
Corp. v. Chimo Shipping, Ltd., 236 F. Supp. 229, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Charles J. Rounds Co. v.
Joint Council of Teamsters No. 42, 4 Cal. 3d 888, 899, 484 P.2d 1397, 1404, 95 Cal. Rptr. 53, 60
(1971); Landreth v. South Coast Rock Co., 136 Cal. App. 457, 462, 29 P.2d 225, 226 (1934); e.g.,
Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Parsons & Whittemore, Inc., 255 App. Div. 589, 8 N.Y.S.2d 432
(1938).
102. Landreth v. South Coast Rock Co., 136 Cal. App. 457, 462, 29 P.2d 225, 226 (1934)
(emphasis added).
103. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960); Charles J. Rounds
Co. v. Joint Council of Teamsters No. 42,4 Cal. 3d 888, 892, 484 P.2d 1397, 1399, 95 Cal. Rptr. 53,
55 (1971) (quoting Butchers' Union Local 229 v. Cudahy Packing Co., 66 Cal. 2d 925, 931, 428
P.2d 849, 852, 59 Cal. Rptr. 713,716 (1967)); Pneucrete Corp. v. United States Fidelity Guar. Co.,
7 Cal. App. 2d 733, 741, 46 P.2d 1000, 1003-04 (1935).
104. Sauter v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. App. 3d 25, 29, 82 Cal. Rptr. 395, 397 (1969); Pneucretc
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The actual enforcement procedure is relatively simple. The party
desiring arbitration must petition the trial court for an order to compel
arbitration and, if necessary, to stay pending litigation. 10 5 Such peti-
tions are heard in summary fashion on the usual notice required for the
hearing of motions. 0 6 If the order is granted, petitioner may proceed
to arbitration in accordance with the agreement to arbitrate. 10 7
The issue of whether a party by inaction or delay has waived his
right to compel arbitration under an agreement to arbitrate is a ques-
tion of fact determined at trial.108 The courts, however, disagree over
the proper test of waiver to be used in making that determination. The
California courts have, at different times, employed two tests-reasona-
bleness of the delay and actual litigation. The federal courts consider
the decisive factor to be the presence or absence of prejudice to the
nonwaiving party.
1. The 'Reasonableness" Standard
The traditional "reasonableness" test was clearly articulated in Sawday
v. Vista Zrrigation District:10 9
Corp. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 7 Cal. App. 2d 733, 741, 46 P.2d 1000, 1003-04
(1935).
105. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1976); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.2 (West Cum. Supp. 1979); see text
accompanying notes 102-03 supra.
106. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1976); 6 CAL. JUR. 3d, Arbitration andAward § 12, at 29 (1973).
107. See, e.g., Gunderson v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. App. 3d 138, 144, 120 Cal. Rptr. 35, 39
(1975), disapproved on other grounds, Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge, Highway and Transp. Dist.,
23 Cal. 3d 180, 188, 588 P.2d 1261, 1265, 151 Cal. Rptr. 837, 841 (1979).
Before Doers, it had been widely held in California that failure to plead an arbitration agree-
ment in one's answer constituted waiver of rights under the agreement. E.g, Local 659, I.A.T.S.E.
v. Color Corp. of America, 47 Cal. 2d 189, 194, 302 P.2d 294, 297 (1956); Butchers Union Local
532 v. Farmers Mkts., 67 Cal. App. 3d 905, 913, 136 Cal. Rptr. 894, 899 (1977); Gunderson v.
Superior Court, 46 Cal. App. 3d 138, 143-44, 120 Cal. Rptr. 35, 39 (1975). This is still the law in
federal jurisdictions. E.g., Cornell & Co. v. Barber & Ross Co., 360 F.2d 512, 513 n.3 (D.C. Cir.
1966); Necchi Sewing Mach. Sales Corp. v. Carl, 260 F. Supp. 665, 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Under
the Doers actual litigation standard, see text accompanying notes 124-41 infra, however, such
failure to plead may not constitute waiver. See Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge, Highway and
Transp. Dist., 23 Cal. 3d 180, 188 & n.2, 588 P.2d 1261, 1265 & n.2, 151 Cal. Rptr. 837, 841 & n.2
(1979).
108. Daugherty Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 14 Cal. App. 3d 151, 158,92 Cal. Rptr. 120, 124
(1971); Ted Stoppick & Co. v. Ernest Glick Co., 110 N.Y.S.2d 850, 854 (Sup. Ct. 1952). Although
waiver of the right to compel arbitration is a question of fact, waiver may also be found as a
matter of law. When the record establishes waiver as a matter of law, the trial judge's order to
arbitrate nonetheless has been held to be an abuse of discretion. See Gunderson v. Superior
Court, 46 Cal. App. 3d 138, 143, 120 Cal. Rptr. 35, 38 (1975), disapproved on other grounds, Doers
v. Golden Gate Bridge, Highway and Transp. Dist., 23 Cal. 3d 180, 188, 588 P.2d 1261, 1265, 151
Cal. Rptr. 837, 841 (1979); Sawday v. Vista Irrigation Dist., 64 Cal. 2d 833, 836, 415 P.2d 816, 818,
52 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (1966). But see note 107 supra.
109. 64 Cal. 2d 833, 415 P.2d 816, 52 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1966).
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Where an arbitration agreement does not specify a time within
which arbitration must be demanded, a reasonable time is allowed,
and what constitutes a reasonable time is a question of fact, depend-
ing upon the situation of the parties, the nature of the transaction,
and the facts of the particular case."o
As Sawday indicates, the question of waiver was determined on a case-
by-case basis, depending upon the particular factual situation involved.
Underlying the reasonableness test was the notion that unreasona-
ble delay in invoking arbitration evidences an intent inconsistent with
the intention to arbitrate."' This was the principal rationale in Gunder-
son v. Sufperior Court." 2 In Gunderson, one plaintiff signed a standard-
ized form, including an agreement to arbitrate, so as to obtain
treatment at a medical clinic for the second plaintiff, her minor son.' 13
The plaintiffs subsequently filed a medical malpractice suit against the
clinic, a local hospital, and various doctors.' ' 4 Two months later, the
defendants made a demand for arbitration which the plaintiffs re-
fused." 5 Subsequently, the plaintiffs served a set of interrogatories,
and the defendants took the deposition of one of the plaintiffs." 6 Fi-
nally, nearly six months after the suit was filed, the defendants peti-
tioned the superior court for an order to compel arbitration, which was
ultimately granted." 7 The plaintiffs sought to overturn the order by
writ of mandate," 8 arguing that the defendants had waived their arbi-
tration rights by failing to plead the arbitration agreement in their an-
swer,1 9 and that the defendants had actively litigated the matter to the
extent that they should be estopped from asserting the right to compel
110. Id. at 836, 415 P.2d at 818, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 3.
111. Medico-Dental Bldg. Co. v. Horton & Converse, 21 Cal. 2d 411, 432, 132 P.2d 457, 468
(1942).
112. 46 Cal. App. 3d 138, 120 Cal. Rptr. 35 (1975), disapproved in part, Doers v. Golden Gate
Bridge, Highway and Transp. Dist., 23 Cal. 3d 180, 188, 588 P.2d 1261, 1265, 151 Cal. Rptr. 837,
841 (1979).
113. 46 Cal. App. 3d at 141, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 36-37.
114. Id. at 141, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
115. Id. at 142, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Because an order to arbitrate is not appealable, see text accompanying notes 46-47 supra,
a party nevertheless wishing to appeal such an order must resort to an extraordinary writ such as
mandamus. Eg., Maddy v. Castle, 58 Cal. App. 3d 716, 719, 130 Cal. Rptr. 160, 161 (1976),
disapproved on other grounds, Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge, Highway and Transp. Dist., 23 Cal.
3d 180, 188, 588 P.2d 1261, 1265, 151 Cal. Rptr. 837, 841 (1979).
119. 46 Cal. App. 3d at 142, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
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arbitration. 2 ' The court issued the writ of mandate that overturned
the order to arbitrate,' 2' holding that "the conduct of [the defendants]
was clearly inconsistent with any real intent to arbitrate."'' 22 Using the
case-by-case analysis, the court pointed to three particular aspects of
the defendants' behavior in support of its holding: (1) the defendants'
failure to plead the agreement in their answer; (2) their delay in seeking
judicial enforcement of the agreement; and (3) their failure to carry out
their portion of the agreement to designate an arbitrator. 23
2. The New California Standard- 'Actual Litigation"
What appears to be a new standard for waiver of the right to compel
arbitration--'actual litigation"-was articulated by the California
Supreme Court in Doers P. Golden Gate Bridge, Highway and Transpor-
tation District. 24 Appellant Doers was a member of the Amalgamated
Transit Union and was employed at the Greyhound Bus Company's
Santa Rosa terminal.'25 Appellee Golden Gate Bridge, Highway and
Transportation District began, with federal funds, a commuter bus
service between San Francisco and Santa Rosa. The result of this new
service was that Greyhound significantly reduced the size and scope of
its Santa Rosa operation and transferred Doers from full-time to relief
employment. 26
Because the district was receiving federal assistance, it had a statu-
tory obligation to protect the interests of workers affected by the use
and disposition of such assistance.' 27 To that end, the district had en-
tered into an agreement with the union, providing that displaced em-
ployees of preexisting transportation systems were to have first
120. Id. This sounds a great deal like a claim under the federal prejudice standard, see text
accompanying notes 142-71 infra. The court, however, ignored the implication.
Petitioners also alleged that the contract containing the agreement was invalid and unen-
forceable in that there was a lack of mutual assent, that the contract violated public policy and
that the contract was one of adhesion. The court's disposition of the case made consideration of
these issues unnecessary. 46 Cal. App. 3d at 143, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
121. Id. at 145, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
122. Id. at 144, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
123. Id.
124. 23 Cal. 3d 180, 588 P.2d 1261, 151 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1979). Although the Doers court did
not explicitly announce a new standard, it disapproved parts of four appellate court decisions and
reinterpreted a number of other precedents in reaching its holding, thus making it clear that judi-
cial determination of whether the right to compel arbitration has been waived rests on new crite-
ria. See id. at 185-88, 588 P.2d at 1263-65, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 839-41; text accompanying notes 134-
41 infra; note 10 supra.
125. 23 Cal. 3d at 183, 588 P.2d at 1262, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
126. Id.
127. Id.; see Urban Mass Transit Act of 1964, 49 U.S.C. § 1609(c) (1976).
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opportunity for comparable employment with the district. 28 The
agreement provided for arbitration of all disputes. 29
Doers filed a complaint in federal district court against the trans-
portation district and the union, citing numerous grievances. 130  The
suit was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.' 3' Doers and
the union then filed a motion in the superior court to compel arbitra-
tion pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure sections 1281.2
and 1290.132 The motion was denied on the grounds that Doers had
waived his right to compel arbitration by filing suit in district court. 133
The sole issue on appeal was whether merely filing suit in a judi-
cial forum amounts to waiver of the right to arbitrate. 34  The court
held that it does not. 35 Although the court looked for support in fed-
eral case lawt36 and the public policy favoring arbitration, 37 the foun-
dation of the opinion is a reinterpretation of prior case law. Before
Doers, it was settled law in California that the mere filing of an action
in a judicial forum waived any rights to compel arbitration. 38 The
Doers court, however, found that such cases spoke in terms of actually
litigating the suit, rather than merely filing it, as the proper test for
128. 23 Cal. 3d at 183-84, 588 P.2d at 1262, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
129. Id. at 184, 588 P.2d at 1262, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. Section 1281.2 requires a court to order twodisputing parties to arbitrate if it deter-
iines that a valid agreement to arbitrate exists between them. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1281.2
West Cum. Supp. 1979). Section 1290 provides that an order to arbitrate may be requested by
etition of one of the parties. Id. § 1290 (West 1972).
133. 23 Cal. 3d at 184-85, 185 n.l, 588 P.2d at 1262-63, 1263 n.l, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 838-39, 839
..1.
134. Id. at 185, 588 P.2d at 1263, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
135. Id. at 183, 588 P.2d at 1262, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
136. "Under federal law, it is clear that the mere filing of a lawsuit does not waive contractual
irbitration rights. The presence or absence of prejudice from the litigation of the dispute is the
Jeterminative issue under federal law." Id. at 188, 588 P.2d at 1265, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 841; see text
accompanying notes 142-71 infra.
137. The court stated that
"strong public policy in California favor[s] peaceful resolution of employment disputes
by means of arbitration." Because arbitration is a highly favored means of settling such
disputes, the courts have been admonished to "closely scrutinize any allegation of waiver
of such favored right" and to "indulge every intendment to give effect to such proceed-
ings."
Id. at 189, 588 P.2d at 1266, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 842 (citations omitted); see text accompanying notes
41-42 supra.
138. E.g., Local 659, I.A.T.S.E. v. Color Corp. of America, 47 Cal. 2d 189, 194, 302 P.2d 294,
297 (1956); Butchers Union Local 532 v. Farmers Mkts., 67 Cal. App. 3d 905, 913, 136 Cal. Rptr.
894, 899 (1977); Gunderson v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. App. 3d 138, 143, 120 Cal. Rptr. 35, 38
(1975); Fejer v. Paonessa, 104 Cal. App. 2d 190, 198, 231 P.2d 507, 511 (1951).
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waiver. ' 39 The court thus concluded that the "filing suit" test of waiver
is unsupported by a proper reading of precedent, 4 ' and that "the rele-
vant early precedents . . . support only the proposition that it is the
judicial litigation of the merits of arbitrable issues which waives a
party's right to arbitration."' 4'
3. The Federal 'Prejudice" Test
Federal law differs significantly from both California tests. It has been
widely held in the federal courts that waiver "may not rest mechanical-
ly on some act such as the filing of a complaint or answer but must, find
a basis in prejudice to the objecting party."' 14z The prejudice standard
originated with language from The Belize:143
When a party who has agreed to arbitrate any controversy that may
arise prefers to take a controversy to court in the ordinary way, there
comes a time in the course of the litigation when it would be unfair
to permit one side to resort to arbitration over the protest of the
other. 144
Examples of prejudice include being forced to bear the expenses of a
lengthy trial, 145 loss of evidence due to the delay in seeking arbitra-
tion, 146 taking advantage of judicial discovery procedures not available
in arbitration,"'7 and, by reason of delay, having taken any steps in
litigation to one's detriment or expended any amounts of money. 4 8
The federal mode of analysis is amply illustrated by Carcich v.
RederiA/B Nordie,149 in which the court considered two consolidated
appeals involving longshoremen who had been injured while loading
freighters.' ° In one appeal, the plaintiff longshoreman filed suit
139. 23 Cal. 3d at 185-88, 588 P.2d at 1263-65, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 839-41.
140. Id. at 185-86, 188, 588 P.2d at 1263-64, 1265, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 839-40, 841.
141. Id. at 188, 588 P.2d at 1265, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 841 (emphasis in original).
142. Carolina Throwing Co. v. S & E Novelty Corp., 442 F.2d 329, 331 (4th Cir. 1971) (quot-
ing Balson Yarn & Fabric Mach. Group, Inc. v. Saurer-Allma GmbH-Allgauer'Maschinenbau,
311 F. Supp. 68, 73 (D.S.C. 1970)); accord, Shinto Shipping Co. v. Fibrex & Shipping Co., 572
F.2d 1328, 1330 (9th Cir. 1978); ITT World Communications Inc. v. Communications Workers,
422 F.2d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1970); Michael v. Steamship Thonasis, 311 F. Supp. 170, 181 (N.D. Cal.
1970).
143. 25 F. Supp. 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
144. Id. at 664.
145. E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Constr. Co. of Texas, 559 F.2d,268, 269 (5th Cir. 1977).
146. N & D Fashions, Inc. v. DHJ Indus., Inc. 548 F.2d 722, 728 (8th Cir. 1977).
147. Carcich v. Rederi A/B Nordie, 389 F.2d 692, 696 n.7 (2d Cir. 1968).
148. Commercial Metals Co. v. International Union Marine Corp., 294 F. Supp. 570, 574
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). These factors would also seem to be relevant in a reasonableness test. Compare
text accompanying notes 145-47 supra with factors enumerated in note 93 supra.
149. 389 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1968).
150. Id. at 693.
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against Cunard Steamship Co., which had chartered the vessels.' 51
Nearly six months later, the defendant answered, pleading the agree-
ment to arbitrate contained in the charter agreement.152 Plaintiff filed a
note of issue one month later'53 without objection from the defend-
ant. 154 Over a year later, a pretrial conference was held, and more than
a year after that, the parties filed a pretrial order, wherein the defend-
ant reiterated its desire to arbitrate the dispute. 55 The defendant also
took the plaintiff's deposition." 6 Nearly three years later, shortly
before the case was to be calendared for trial, the defendant moved for
a stay of litigation pending arbitration. 7 The motion was denied. 5 8
In the other appeal, the plaintiff longshoreman filed suit against the
shipowner, who impleaded Cunard as a third-party defendant. 5 9
Cunard again asserted an agreement to arbitrate. 160 Several months
later, plaintiff filed a note of issue, without Cunard's objection,' 6 ' and
shortly thereafter Cunard produced evidence pursuant to plaintiff's dis-
covery motion.' 62 Pretrial conferences were held 6 3 and finally, when
the case had reached the pretrial stage,"6 Cunard moved for a stay of
litigation pending arbitration.165 This motion was also denied. 66 The
basis of both denials was that Cunard had waived its right to arbitrate
by its participation in litigation, failure to object, and delay in formally
asserting its right to arbitrate. 67
On consolidated appeal, the court held that the trial court erred in
both cases in finding waiver.'68 The rationale for the decision was the
absence of any showing of prejudice. 69 Despite Cunard's extensive in-
151. Id. at 694.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 695 n.5.
155. Id. at 694.
156. Id. at 695 n.5.
157. Id. at 694.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 695 n.5.
162. Id. at 694.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 695 n.5.
165. Id. at 694.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 693, 695 n.5.
168. Id. at 696.
169. Id.
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volvement in litigation, and long delay in formally moving for arbitra-
tion, the court found that,
It is ... the presence or absence of prejudice which is determinative
of the issue. As an abstract exercise in logic it may appear that it is
inconsistent for a party to participate in a lawsuit for breach of a
contract, and later to ask the court to stay that litigation pending
arbitration. Yet the law is clear that such participation, standing
alone, does not constitute a waiver, . . . and mere delay in seeking a
stay of the proceedings without some resultant prejudice to a party
cannot carry the day.' 70
Reasoning that the plaintiff would not have proceeded differently had a
stay been requested earlier, and that Cunard took no advantage of dis-
covery proceedings that were unavailable in arbitration, the court held
that prejudice to the plaintiff was absent, and, therefore, the motions to
stay litigation pending arbitration should have been granted. 7'
II. DEFICIENCIES OF CURRENT ARBITRATION LAW
All three standards of waiver-reasonableness, actual litigation, and
prejudice-have serious flaws. Far from promoting the policy goals of
arbitration, they tend to subvert those goals. Moreover, all the stan-
dards are in conflict with the general principles of contract waiver law.
A. FRUSTRATION OF POLICY GOALS
Current law tends to frustrate the policy goals of arbitration by encour-
aging litigation and increasing the delay and expense of arbitration.
These factors also result in substantive unfairness to plaintiffs in the
arbitration process.
170. Id. (citations omitted).
171. Id.
The federal prejudice standard appears to borrow heavily from the equitable principles of
estoppel and laches by requiring not only inconsistent action, but also detrimental reliance on
such action by the party asserting waiver. Compare text accompanying and preceding note 170
supra with D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.3, at 41-44 (1973) (defining
laches and estoppel). Nevertheless, the federal courts write in terms of waiver, which does not
require detrimental reliance by the party asserting it. A misleading aspect of case law generally in
the area of waiver of the right to compel arbitration is the failure of the courts to carefully deline-
ate the limits of each of these doctrines-waiver, estoppel, and laches-in the context of contrac-
tual agreements to arbitrate. Articulation of these limits is beyond the scope of this Note and, in
any case, would not be particularly helpful-regardless of its legal title, the operation of the
waiver principle is the same. Cf. W. SHAKESPEARE, Romeo and Juliet, Act II, scene 2, in THE
COMPLETE WORKS OF SHAKESPEARE 752 (1973) ("What's in a name? that which we call a rose/By
any other name would smell as sweet"). For a collection of cases dealing with forfeiture of arbi-
tration rights because of laches, see Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 1125 (1954).
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1. Increase in Litigation
In direct contradiction to the established policy of arbitration to re-
move cases from the over-crowded court system,172 the reasonableness
and prejudice tests for waiver173 actually encourage litigation. This is a
result of the uncertainty that surrounds the tests: Whenever the law is
indefinite to the extent that the ability to predict the outcome of cases is
significantly impaired, litigation will increase. 174 Under the prejudice
and reasonableness tests, two factors foster uncertainty and its corre-
spondent increase in litigation: the case-by-case mode of analysis, 171
and judicial reluctance to find prejudice or unreasonableness when
waiver is alleged.
Uncertainty inheres in any case-by-case method of legal decision-
making. 76 Courts resort to this method in an area of law because gen-
erally applicable rules are thought to be nonexistent or too difficult to
apply. 17  Thus, the resolution of individual cases turns on the presence
or absence of numerous factors, the significance of each varying ac-
cording to the mix of factors present in the particular case. 178  Because
factual circumstances vary so widely, disputing parties often have little
indication of which factors in the unique mix of factual circumstances
the court will consider controlling. Hence, the parties are unable to
predict the outcome of the case. 179 Both parties wil appear to have
significant and approximately equal chances of having their interpreta-
172. See text accompanying notes 6, 64-67 supra.
173. The actual litigation test is criticized separately. See text accompanying notes 197-206
infra.
174. R. POSNER, supra note 84, § 20.2, at 422, § 20.5, at 426-27; see Hoenig & Goetz, A Ra-
tional Approach to "Crashworthy"Automobiles The Needfor Judicial Responsibility, 6 Sw. U.L.
Rav. 1, 1-2 (1974). Posner also argues that increased litigation actually decreases litigation in the
long run by forcing the formulation of more definite common law rules. R. POSNER, supra note
84, § 20.2, at 422. This, however, assumes the production of rationally reconcilable precedents;
such consistency is not found in the law of waiver of arbitration rights. Compare text accompany-
ing notes 111-23 supra with text accompanying notes 124-41 supra and text accompanying notes
142-71 supra.
175. See text accompanying note 108 supra.
176. This uncertainty results because the holding of each case is substantially dependent on
factual context, which varies widely even among cases involving similar subject matter. See text
accompanying notes 177-79 infra.
177. Cf. Rakas v. Illinois, 99 S. Ct. 421,432 (1978) ("Where the factual premises for a rule are
so generally prevalent that little would be lost and much would be gained by abondoning case-by-
case analysis, we have not hesitated to do so"); Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court,
Viewed From Above, 22 SYRcus L. REv. 635, 662 (1971) (many complex fact situations are
better resolved by judicial discretion than general rules).
178. See, e.g., Note, Equitable Enforcement of Negative Covenants in Employment Contracts, 6
CASE W. REs. L. REa. 72, 72 (1954); note 93 and text accompanying notes 145-48 supra.
179. See, e.g., id. at 72-73; Hoenig & Goetz, supra note 174, at 1-2.
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tion of the issue accepted by the court in litigation, and thus there will
be little incentive for either party to settle out of court or to acquiesce in
the other's interpretation of the issue.
Such a problem is evident in the law of waiver of arbitration
rights. Under both the prejudice and the reasonableness standards,
courts consider a multiplicity of factors in adjudicating the issue of
waiver-e.g., delay, assertion, in the answer of the arbitration agree-
ment, filing suit, participation in discovery or other litigation proceed-
ings, answering to the merits-few of which are themselves dispositive
of the waiver issue.180 Moreover, the adjudicative significance of each
factor varies widely according to factual context; a combination of fac-
tors that dispose of the issue in one case may be deemed insignificant in
another case."" The parameters of judicial decisionmaking are so un-
certain that unless the factual implications of a waiver case are clear
and almost indisputable, parties will find it in their interest to litigate
the issue of waiver.
As previously mentioned, most modem courts look very favorably
on arbitration. 82 As a result, in litigation involving arbitration agree-
ments, courts usually strive to reach a result that will permit arbitra-
tion. 8 3  Unfortunately, this strict judicial adherence to a policy
favoring arbitration has exacerbated uncertainty in the law of waiver.
Factual circumstances that clearly indicate the appropriateness of a
waiver finding are often disregarded or superficially distinguished so
that the favored arbitration process may be implemented.'84 Conse-
quently, a party who appears to have waived his arbitration rights may
nevertheless be well advised to litigate the waiver issue in the hope that
180. E.g., Shinto Shipping Co. v. Fibrex & Shipping Co., 572 F.2d 1328, 1330 (9th Cir. 1978)
(inconsistent action insufficient); Carcich v. Rederi A/B Nordie, 389 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1968)
(inconsistent action insufficient); Chatan Shipping Co. v. Fertex S.S. Corp., 352 F.2d 291, 293 (2d
Cir. 1965) (filing complaint insufficient); Reynolds v. Jamaica Mines, Ltd. v. La Societe Navale
Caennaise, 239 F.2d 689 (4th Cir. 1956) (asserting counterclaim insufficient); Rootes Motors, Inc.
v. S.S. Carina, 1964 A.M.C. 2754 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (filing answer without pleading arbitration
insufficient).
181. Compare Carolina Throwing Co. v. S & E Novelty Corp., 442 F.2d 329 (4th Cir. 1971)
with American Locomotive Co. v. Chemical Research Corp., 171 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1948).
182. See text accompanying notes 41-42 supra.
183. See id.
184. See, e.g., Hilti v. Oldach, 392 F.2d 368, 372 & n.9 (1st Cir. 1968); Pacific Inv. v. Town-
send, 58 Cal. App. 3d 1, 11-12, 129 Cal. Rptr. 489, 494 (1976); Seidman & Seidman v. Wolfson, 50
Cal. App. 3d 826, 836-37, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 879 (1975); see Gavlik Constr. Co. v. H.F. Campbell
Co., 526 F.2d 777, 783 (3d Cir. 1975) ("recent cases have only found waiver where the demand for
arbitration came long after the suit commenced and when both parties had engaged in extensive
discovery") (emphasis added).
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the court will ignore facts militating for waiver in deference to arbitra-
tion.' 85
2. Increase in the Delay and Expense of Arbitration
Litigation of the waiver issue substantially increases the costs of arbi-
tration. Whenever steps in the arbitration process must be litigated
before arbitration can proceed, the disadvantages of litigation are in-
jected into arbitration,'8 6 possibly to the extent that eventual resolution
under arbitration takes longer than normal litigation would have. t87
Because the very purpose of submitting matters to arbitration is to
avoid litigation and its disadvantages, 88 there is a strong public policy
in favor of resolving arbitrations speedily and with a minimum ofjudi-
cial interference.'89 Arbitration law must discourage litigation of inter-
mediate steps in the arbitration process if it is to function as the
streamlined and efficient dispute-resolution mechanism it is meant to
be. 19 0
Another problem, apart from increased litigation, that increases
the delay and expense of arbitration is that all three tests for waiver-
reasonableness, actual litigation, and prejudice-permit the defendant
to tactically delay final resolution of the dispute. 91 Under the reasona-
185. Cf. Hoenig & Goetz, supra note 174, at 3 n.8 (judicial reluctance to determine liability
issues results in the litigation of virtually any kind of personal injury claim).
186. Comment, supra note 24, at 949. Such litigation is likely where the costs of delay to the
litigating party are relatively low. .d. at 946 n.65.
187. See, e.g., Weight Watchers of Quebec, Ltd. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 398 F. Supp.
1057, 1061 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
188. See text accompanying notes 64-92 supra.
189. Lesser Towers, Inc. v. Roscoe-Ajax Constr. Co., 271 Cal. App. 2d 675, 702, 77 Cal. Rptr.
100, 117 (1969); McRae v. Superior Court, 221 Cal. App. 166, 170, 34 Cal. Rptr. 346, 349 (1963);
Comment, supra note 24, at 949; see World Brilliance Corp. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 342 F.2d 362,
365 (2d Cir. 1965); cf. Laufman v. Hall-Mack Co., 215 Cal. App. 2d 87, 88, 29 Cal. Rptr. 829, 831
(1963) (quoting Jardine-Matheson Co. v. Pacific Orient Co., 100 Cal. App. 572, 576, 280 P. 697,
698 (1929)) ("'[i]f at the very threshold of the proceeding the defaulting party could appeal and
thereby indefinitely delay the matter of arbitration, the object of the law and the purpose of the
written [arbitration] agreement of the parties would be entirely defeated' ").
190. East San Bernadino County Water Dist. v. City of San Bernardino, 33 Cal. App. 3d 942,
951 n.3, 109 Cal. Rptr. 510, 516 n.3 (1973); Henderson, supra note 3, at 972-73; see text accompa-
nying notes 41-48, 58-72 supra.
191. The tests also permit manipulation for delay by the plaintiff but this is not a significant
problem because delay will rarely be in the plaintiff's interest. See text accompanying notes 58-69
supra. Nevertheless, it is not uncommon for a plaintiff to act against his immediate interest in an
expeditious resolution of the dispute in an attempt to mislead the defendant into waiving his right
to compel arbitration. See, e.g., Shinto Shipping Co. v. Fibrex & Shipping Co., 425 F. Supp. 1088,
1092 (N.D. Cal. 1976), aff'd, 572 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1978); Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge, Highway
and Transp. Dist., 23 Cal. 3d 180, 184-85, 185 n.1, 588 P.2d 1261, 1262-63, 1263 n.l, 151 Cal. Rptr.
837, 838-39, 839 n.1 (1979).
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bleness and prejudice tests, whereas a plaintiff party to an agreement to
arbitrate waives his arbitration rights upon his filing an action in a judi-
cial forum, 19z the defendant to such action is not legally required to
choose his preferred forum until the pretrial litigation process is well
underway. 93 The plaintiff must push his action forward in the courts if
he is to obtain redress, yet he does so facing the probability that the
defendant will eventually move for arbitration.194 To the extent that
trial preparation and preparation for arbitration do not duplicate each
other,195 time and money are wasted by both sides in preparing for
litigation that never occurs. Society also loses in that scarce legal and
judicial resources are expended without contributing to the resolution
of a dispute. Rather than permit such a waste of time and money, it is
a function of arbitration to provide a speedy and inexpensive alterna-
tive to litigation. 96
The actual litigation standard of Doers is particularly susceptible
to tactical abuse. Under that standard, the right to compel arbitration
of a case is not waived until the dispute is "actually litigated" in an-
other forum. 197 This presumably means that, regardless of the implica-
tions that a party's conduct has with respect to his intention to arbitrate,
such a party can retain his arbitration rights until the case goes to
192. Charles J. Rounds Co. v. Joint Council of Teamsters No. 42, 4 Cal. 3d 888, 899, 484 P.2d
1397, 1404, 95 Cal. Rptr. 53, 60-63 (1971); Maddy v. Castle, 58 Cal. App. 3d 716, 721-22, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 160, 162-63 (1976), disapproved, Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge, Highway and Transp. Dist.,
23 Cal. 3d 180, 188, 588 P.2d 1261, 1265, 151 Cal. Rptr. 837, 841 (1979); Gunderson v. Superior
Court, 46 Cal. App. 3d 138, 144, 120 Cal. Rptr. 35, 38 (1975) (dictum), disapproved, Doers v.
Golden Gate Bridge, Highway and Transp. Dist., 23 Cal. 3d 180, 188, 588 P.2d 1261, 1265, 151
Cal. Rptr. 837, 841 (1979). Contra Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc. v. Chronis, 72 Cal. App. 3d
596, 602, 140 Cal. Rptr. 160, 164 (1977); text accompanying notes 124-41 supra.
193. This is a result of the courts excessively favoring arbitration and refusing to find waiver
from delay alone. See notes 176, 180-81 supra.
194. When the plaintiff wishes to litigate, arbitration will generally be in the best interests of
the defendant. E.g., Main v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 67 Cal. App. 3d 19, 31,
136 Cal. Rptr. 376, 385 (1977); see note 202 infra. Moreover, the defendant will often have pled
the arbitation agreement as a defense in his answer, even though he has not moved to compel
arbitration.
195. Preparation for trial is often very different from preparation for arbitration. American
Locomotive Co. v. Chemical Research Corp., 171 F.2d 115, 121 (6th Cir. 1948), cer. denied, 336
U.S. 909 (1949). Trial preparation is likely to be more extensive and technical (and hence expen-
sive) than preparation for arbitration because of the rigid procedural formality of a trial. Id.;
Milectic v. Holm & Wonsild, 294 F. Supp. 772, 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); text accompanying notes 47,
5 1-53 supra; see, e.g., Graig Shipping Co. v. Midland Overseas Shipping Corp., 259 F. Supp. 929,
931 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
196. Utah Constr. Co. v. Western Pac. Ry., 174 Cal. 156, 162 P. 631, 632 (1916); Pneucrete
Corp. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 7 Cal. App. 2d 733, 740, 46 P.2d 1000, 1003 (1935);
see text accompanying notes 41-48, 58-69 supra.
197. See text accompanying notes 124-41 supra.
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trial.'98 Under this standard, then, most of the pretrial judicial process
will be a deadweight loss of resources whenever arbitration is in-
voked.1 99 Moreover, the plaintiff in such a case is unfairly burdened.
Although a plaintiff's needless expenditure of time and money for liti-
gation that never takes place is balanced somewhat by the fact that the
defendant also wastes his resources, it remains that delay imposes
greater costs and risks on plaintiffs than on defendants."' Any plaintiff
who endures considerable delay in attempting to obtain redress runs
the risk that his case will be significantly, even fatally, weakened in the
process.20' The plaintiff chooses litigation expecting that the risks of
delay will be outweighed by what he perceives as advantages of litiga-
tion over arbitration. 02 What actually happens is that the plaintiff in-
198. The Doers court did not explicitly undertake to define "actually litigated." Four of the
cases from which the court sought to elucidate the actual litigation standard, however, involved
litigation to a judgment on the merits. See Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge, Highway and Transp.
Dist., 23 Cal. 3d at 187-88, 588 P.2d at 1263-64, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 839-40 (discussing Local 659,
I.A.T.S.E. v. Color Corp. of America, 47 Cal. 2d 189, 302 P.2d 294 (1956); Case v. Kadota Fig
Ass'n, 35 Cal. 2d 596, 220 P.2d 912 (1950); Jones v. Poliock, 34 Cal. 2d 863, 215 P.2d 733 (1950);
Landreth v. South Coast Rock Co., 136 Cal. App. 457, 29 P.2d 225 (1934)). It is, therefore, a
reasonable inference that "actually litigated" means having gone to trial. Under such a standard,
even if a party actively participates in pretrial actions such as depositions and interrogatories, or
has joined issue on the merits, such party may nevertheless move to compel arbitration so long as
the case has not yet proceeded to trial.
199. Although some duplication occurs in preparing for arbitration as opposed to preparing
for trial, the complex nature of litigation in the judicial forum demands significant preparations
that are not called for in an arbitration. See notes 71-72, 195 and accompanying text supra.
The Doers court is open to a further criticism, beyond the actual effects of its waiver stan-
dard-that in formulating the actual litigation test for waiver it committed the same error for
which it criticized other courts. The majority opinion in Doers roundly criticizes earlier cases as
lacking support for their holding that "a party waives his contractual arbitration right by merely
filing a lawsuit." 23 Cal. 3d at 185-86, 588 P.2d at 1263-64, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 839-40. It then
reinterprets earlier cases and reads them as articulating the actual litigation test of waiver. Id. at
188, 588 P.2d at 1265, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 841. The cases discussed, however, provide support only
for the far narrower proposition that mere filing of a lawsuit in a judicial forum does not consti-
tute waiver of the right to compel arbitration, which, indeed, is the true holding of Doers. Com.
pare id. at 183, 588 P.2d at 1262, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 838 with id. at 186-87, 588 P.2d at 1264-65, 151
Cal. Rptr. at 840-41.
200. See text accompanying notes 84-89 supra.
201. Id.
202. Cf R. POSNER, supra note 84, § 4.12, at 96 ("the reason behind a breach of contract...
is less often the bad faith of the promisor than the occurrence of some event. . . which makes
performance uneconomical"). Because the lay adjudicator is much more likely to be swayed by
evidence of a plaintiff's injury (both in determining liability and in calculating damages) than is
the professional adjudicator, see Damaska, supra note 71, at 538-39, it is sometimes contended
that favorable verdicts are more common and damage awards larger at a jury trial than at arbitra-
tion; see Note, supra note 66, at 410; e.g., Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 63 Cal. App. 3d 345, 361,
133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 786 (1976). But see Henderson, supra note 3, at 994 n.195. This is particularly
the case in personal injury litigation. See Note, supra note 66, at 410 nn.56 & 57. In other cases,
the law may be thought to be on the plaintiff's side, making it safer to have the case adjudicated in
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curs those risks, often weakening his case by waiting for trial, and ends
up in arbitration anyway.2"3 The plaintiff, therefore, bears much of the
cost of both arbitration and litigation while enjoying the full advan-
tages of neither.2°4
It can be argued that the plaintiff brings the consequences of delay
on himself by choosing to litigate in contradiction to his contractual
agreement to arbitrate. This argument, however, is fallacious. While
the defendant is certainly entitled to specific performance of the arbi-
tration agreement if he desires to arbitrate, 0 5 it hardly follows that he
is also entitled to the significant advantage that delay may grant him
when it weakens the plaintiff's case.
20 6
B. INCONSISTENCY WITH THE CONCEPT OF CONTRACTUAL WAIVER
Waiver is the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known
a judicial forum strictly bound by legal doctrine and precedent, rather than in an arbitration
forum that is not. See, e.g., Charitable Promotions v. Anka, 58 App. Div. 2d 165, 168-69, 396
N.Y.S.2d 228, 231 (1977).
203. See text accompanying notes 191-94 supra.
204. A famous maxim of equity is "he who comes into equity must come with clean hands,"
31 B.U.L. RE,. 434, 435 (1951) (quoting Bently v. Tibbals, 223 F. 251 (2d Cir. 1915)), or, less
obliquely, "he who seeks equity must do equity," Faddeley, The Clean-Hands Doctrine in Oregon,
37 ORit. L. REv. 160, 160-61 (1958). Although never applied in the context of waiver of the right
to compel arbitration, the maxim is nevertheless relevant because a motion to compel arbitration
is in origin and effect an equitable petition for specific performance of a contractual agreement to
arbitrate. See Trubowitch v. Riverbank Canning Co., 30 Cal. 2d 335, 347, 182 P.2d 182, 190
(1947).
The party requesting equitable relief appeals to the conscience of the court, which has broad
discretionary powers to render a substantively just decision without regard to strict legal forms or
doctrines. 31 B.U.L. REv,. at 435. Because the purpose of equity is to enable a court to grant a just
remedy not available at law, equity courts do not act to grant relief when to do so would lead to an
unjust result. Note, "He Who Comes into Equity Must Come With Clean Hands," 32 B.U.L. REV.
66, 67 (1952). It developed, therefore, that as a condition for receiving equitable relief, he who
appeals to the conscience of the court must not himself have offended that conscience by any
"inequitable" conduct. Faddeley, supra at 161. Such conduct includes not only clearly illegal or
immoral actions, but also sharp business dealings, omissions or misrepresentations not amounting
to fraud, violations of good faith, or taking undue advantage of the situation out of which the suit
arose. Newman, The Hidden Equity. An Analysis of the Moral Content of the Princoles of Equity,
19 HASTINGS L.J. 147, 167-68 & n.103 (1967).
The application of the "clean hands" maxim to the waiver of arbitration situation is clear.
When a defendant has delayed asking for a motion to compel arbitration, he gains an unfair
advantage by reason of his own delay. See text accompanying notes 83-89 supra. Thus, when the
defendant finally does move for specific performance of the agreement to arbitrate, he has not
come into court with "clean hands," and the court should therefore deny his motion to compel
arbitration.
205. See text accompanying notes 101-03 supra.
206. See text accompanying notes 84-89 supra.
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right.20 7 "Voluntary," "intentional," and "known" are words that im-
ply a totally subjective inquiry into the putative waiving party's state of
mind, ie., regardless of the reasonable inferences that may have been
drawn from his actions, did the party actually possess the state of mind
necessary for waiver to have occurred? Obviously, however, an abso-
lutely subjective test has serious problems; it is hard to prove (and easy
to fabricate) a person's thoughts. 08 Waiver, therefore, is determined
by an objective evaluation of the waiving party's state of mind.209 Spe-
cifically, waiver occurs when a party's acts, or failures to act, enable
one to reasonably conclude that such party has willingly and know-
ingly abandoned a right.210 For example, when a party knowingly
holds contractual rights whose purpose is to protect certain contractual
interests, such party may reasonably be expected to act consistently
with such interests by exercising his protective rights when his interests
are infringed; failure to do so implies that the party has acquiesced in
the infringement and chosen not to invoke the contractual protec-
tions.21
207.. American Locomotive Co. v. Chemical Research Corp., 171 F.2d 115, 121 (6th Cir.
1948); Lehigh Valley R.R. v. Insurance Co., 172 F. 364, 365 (2d Cir. 1909). Often, however, such
relinquishment is an ineffective waiver unless supported by consideration or its equivalent, detri-
mental reliance. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 11-34, at 448 (2d ed.
1977). In the context of a contractual agreement to arbitrate, consideration in support of a waiver
of the right to compel arbitration is usually not lacking no matter which party relinquishes the
right. A plaintiff is disadvantaged by a defendant's delay in enforcing the right to compel arbitra-
tion because he must spend time and other resources prosecuting a lawsuit that he believes is no
longer subject to a stay pending arbitration because of the defendant's failure to enforce arbitra-
tion. A defendant is disadvantaged because he spends time and resources defending a lawsuit that
he believes is no longer subject to a stay because of his acquiescence in the plaintiffs choice of a
judicial forum.
208. Cf. note 239 and accompanying text infra (the law of contracts shifted to objective theo-
ries of liability because of the difficulty of proving a party's actual state of mind).
209. Auxiliary Power Corp. v. Eckhardt & Co., 266 F. Supp. 1020, 1022 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
210. The law is rich with examples of this principle. Acceptance and retention of an install-
ment delivery of contractually substandard goods constitute waiver of the right to reject subse-
quent deliveries of goods of similar quality, notwithstanding an explicit contractual right in the
buyer to reject goods of inferior quality. 1. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 207, § 11-37, at
449-51. A criminal defendant's silence in the face of prosecutorial infringement of the defendant's
waivable rights amounts to waiver of such rights. E.g., In re Etherington, 35 Cal. 2d 863, 867, 221
P.2d 942, 945 (1950) (right to notice of hearing in juvenile proceeding); People v. Robinson, 266
Cal. App. 2d 261, 264-65, 72 Cal. Rptr. 33, 35 (1968) (right to speedy trial). Under the Federal
Rules of Evidence, failure to object to the introduction of evidence prevents the attacking of such
introduction on appeal. E.g., Sandez v. United States, 239 F.2d 239, 242 (9th Cir. 1956) (fruits of
an illegal search and seizure). Indeed, one of the best known maxims of the old common law is
"silence shows consent." Hatch v. Benton, 6 Barb. 28, 35 (App. Div. N.Y. 1849) (emphasis in
original).
211. E.g., Yench v. Stockmar, 483 F.2d 820, 823 (10th Cir. 1973) (" "'Acquiescence" is where
a person knows or ought to know that he is entitled to enforce his right. . . .and neglects to do so
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The election of performance doctrine of contract law provides a
good illustration of this principle. Under this doctrine, a party's viola-
tion of a material contractual provision gives rise to an election in the
aggrieved party to either cease performance or continue it.2 2 In the
usual contractual setting, such as the sale and delivery of goods, ceasing
performance, e.g, not accepting contractually substandard goods, pre-
serves the validity and effectiveness of the violated provision, whereas
continued performance, e.g., accepting and paying for the goods,
removes the violated provision by waiver. 13 In other words, failure to
object to the substandard goods implies an election-that of waiving
the violated provision and continuing performance -as much as
does accepting the goods. Election of performance doctrine, therefore,
operates to prevent a party from preserving two inconsistent remedies:
The law simply does not permit a party ... to exercise two alterna-
tive or inconsistent rights or remedies. Even though he expressly
states that he intends to reserve a right, he will, nevertheless, lose it if
he takes an inconsistent course. Thus, one who continues to receive
benefits under a contract and assert rights under it after knowledge of
a breach which would justify him in refusing to go on, cannot subse-
quently set up this breach as an excuse for his own non-performance
even though he asserted from the outset, and consistently, that he
proposed to do so .... t5
This analysis may be profitably applied to waiver of a contractual
right to compel arbitration. Under an agreement to arbitrate, the par-
ties are contractually bound to arbitrate rather than litigate any dispute
arising out of the contract. This duty to arbitrate is thus violated by
either party upon resort to litigation. Such violation of the agreement
for such a length of time as would imply that he intended to waive or abandon his right' ") (quot-
ing Humboldt Livestock Auction, Inc. v. B & H Cattle Co., 261 Iowa 419, 432, 155 N.W.2d 478,
487 (1967)); Radiator Specialty Co. v. Cannon Mills, 97 F.2d 318, 319 (4th Cir. 1938) (" 'By its
course, the defendant waived its right under the arbitration clause . . . . [D]efendant under the
provisions of the Arbitration Law could have applied to the court to enforce arbitration and to
stay all proceedings in the action. Instead of doing so, the defendant answered' ") (quoting Zim-
merman v. Cohen, 236 N.Y. 15, 18-19, 139 N.E. 764, 765 (1923)); Mayron's Bake Shops, Inc. v.
Arrow Stores, Inc., 149 Conn. 149, 154, 176 A.2d 574, 576 (1961); Board of Educ. v. Delle Cese, 65
Misc. 2d 473, 479, 318 N.Y.S.2d 46, 52 (1971) ("A defendant proceeding with and acquiescing in
the procedures of the action at law is by that fact deemed to have elected it and waives his right to
reliance on the arbitration agreement"); see Dugdale & Yates, Variation, Waiver andEstopp el-A
Re-4ppraisal, 39 MOD. L. REv. 680, 689-91 (1976).
212. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 207, § 11-37, at 449; 3A A. CORBIN, supra note 8,
§ 755, at 497; S. WILLISTON & G. THOMPSON, SELECTIONS FROM WILLISTON'S TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS § 683, at 566 (rev. ed. 1938).
213. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 207, § 11-37, at 450.
214. S. WILLISTON & G. THOMPSON, supra note 212, § 684, at 568.
215. Id.
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to arbitrate gives rise to an election in the nonviolating party: He may
treat the arbitration agreement as at an end and acquiesce in the other
party's choice of a judicial forum, or he may reaffirm the agreement by
insisting on arbitration t6
The problem with current law is that it permits parties to retain the
right to arbitrate and avoid waiver upon mere repetition of the agree-
ment to arbitrate, as when a defendant pleads the agreement in his an-
swer without moving to enforce it; such parties are not required to
make an election of remedies nor will the law imply one. A party can,
therefore, preserve two inconsistent remedies simultaneously-the right
to a judicial hearing on the merits and the right to compel arbitration-
in direct contradiction to what would be the result under the election of
performance doctrine in contract law.
There is nothing about the context in which an agreement to arbi-
trate is formed that justifies this anomalous result. The very existence
of a clause compelling arbitration is evidence that, at the time they en-
tered into the contract, the parties felt that their interests would be bet-
ter served by arbitrating, rather than litigating, contractual disputes.
When a dispute does arise, therefore, and one or both of the parties still
desire arbitration, 17 one would reasonably expect that one or both par-
ties would exercise their respective rights to compel arbitration to pro-
tect those interests that initially prompted inclusion of an arbitration
216. See text accompanying notes 101-03 supra. Courts have refused to allow a party to an
arbitrable dispute to preserve both the legal and the arbitration remedy. See, e.g., Second Con-
gressional Soc'y v. Hugh Stubbins & Assoc., 108 N.H. 446, 449, 237 A.2d 673, 675 (1968) ("'any
attempt to go to the merits and to retain still the right to arbitrate is clearly impermissible' ")
(quoting Graig Shipping Co. v. Midland Overseas Shipping Corp., 259 F. Supp. 929, 931
(S.D.N.Y. 1966)).
217. A party to an arbitration agreement may nevertheless not desire arbitration when a con-
tractual dispute arises if conditions have changed substantially between the time of contracting
and the arising of the dispute. For example, at the time of contracting neither party can predict
which of them will be in the dominant legal position when a future dispute arises. Therefore, the
inclusion of an agreement to arbitrate in their contract may have been motivated by the desire of
both parties to mitigate the adverse consequences of being in the weaker legal position in a future
dispute by providing for a dispute resolution mechanism, such as arbitration, that is not bound by
legal precedent. See text accompanying note 76 supra; cf. J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11-17
(1971) (a person determining and implementing rules of justice for a new society, who does not
know what his own status will be in such a society, will choose and implement fair and egalitarian
rules in order to protect against the possibility that he could end up in the most vulnerable and
exploitable status in the new society). When an actual dispute does arise, however, the parties are
able to assess which of them is in the better legal position, if a better position exists in the dispute.
Indeed, both of them may think themselves in the dominant position. Thus one or both may not
wish to arbitrate, so as to take advantage of legal precedent. Even when conditions have changed,
therefore, the failure of a party to move to compel arbitration at the outset of a dispute implies an
intention to waive arbitration rights and rely on litigation.
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clause in the contract. A plaintiff's resort to litigation rather than arbi-
tration is clearly inconsistent with the exercise of, or the intent to exer-
cise, arbitration rights. Likewise, a defendant's failure to immediately
move to compel arbitration, after the adverse contractual party has ini-
tiated litigation, is equally inconsistent with reliance on arbitration
rights. In both cases, one can reasonably infer that the parties have
voluntarily, intentionally, and knowingly waived their arbitration
rights.2 18
Nevertheless, neither the California nor the federal courts find
waiver of the right to compel arbitration on the basis of inaction
alone,219 and the federal courts are generally uninterested in the extent
that a party is involved, or has avoided involvement, in litigation.220
Under the actual litigation standard, neither a party's involvement in
litigation nor his inaction or delay is material so long as the judicial
action has not yet gone to trial, ie., has not yet been "actually liti-
gated. ' '221
III. TWO PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR WAIVER OF THE
RIGHT TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
The substantial problems resulting from current arbitration waiver law
can be avoided by preventing, from the outset of a dispute, any proce-
dural equivocation by the parties as to their intention to arbitrate or
litigate. If arbitration is to be a speedier, more adaptable, and less ex-
pensive alternative to litigation, and still render justice for the parties,
delaying tactics and misleading conduct must be eliminated. Once a
plaintiff decides to litigate a grievance, or a defendant appears in a law-
suit, neither should be permitted to preserve adjudicative rights in both
arbitration and litigation, while testing the procedural waters to see
which forum is preferable.222 When there is disagreement over the best
forum, the party desiring arbitration should invoke the right to compel
arbitration, or else be deemed to have waived it. 2 23 Any standard that
permits postponement of the choice beyond the outset of a dispute cre-
ates the problems of delay, expense, and inconsistency that were dis-
218. See text accompanying notes 93-122 supra.
219. See text accompanying note 180 supra.
220. See text accompanying notes 142-49 supra.
221. See text accompanying notes 124-41; note 198 supra.
222. Cf. DeSapio v. Kohlmeyer, 35 N.Y.2d 402,406, 321 N.E. 2d 770, 773, 362 N.Y.S.2d 843,
847 (1974) ("The courtroom may not be used as a convenient vestibule to the arbitration hall so as
to allow a party to create his own unique structure combining litigation and arbitration").
223. See text accompanying notes 101-03 xupra.
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cussed previously.2 24 In general, it is when a party fies suit in a judicial
forum that an agreement to arbitrate is put in question, and other par-
ties to the agreement are faced with the choice of acquiescing in the
selection of a judicial forum or acting to compel arbitration of the dis-
pute.22 5 Therefore, the first procedural moves that are relevant to the
arbitration agreement are the plaintiff's complaint, and the defendant's
response. This Note proposes that a judge should deem the right to
compel arbitration to have been waived: (1) for a plaintiff party, when
he files suit on an arbitrable issue in a judicial forum, rather than seek-
ing redress through arbitration;226 (2) for a defendant party, when he
fails to file a motion to compel arbitration concurrent with his initial
appearance in court in response to a plaintiff's suit.227
The rationale of the proposal is simple: Waiver of the right to
compel arbitration is implied by any action inconsistent with an inten-
tion to arbitrate.228 Therefore, when an arbitrable issue is put at issue
in litigation, and a party entitled to compel arbitration fails to exercise
his right, the court should construe his inaction as waiver because of its
224. See text accompanying notes 172-221 supra.
225. See text accompanying note 100 supra.
226. This waiver standard has been used in a number of California cases. See, e.g., Maddy v.
Castle, 58 Cal. App. 3d 716, 130 Cal. Rptr. 160 (1976); Gunderson v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. App.
3d 138, 120 Cal. Rptr. 35 (1975). These cases, however, were disapproved by Doers v. Golden
Gate Bridge, Highway and Transp. Dist., 23 Cal. 3d 180, 188, 588 P.2d 1261, 1265, 151 Cal. Rptr.
837, 841 (1979). For a discussion of Doers, see text accompanying notes 124-41 supra.
227. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 430.80 (West 1973). A
defendant's first appearance in a judicial proceeding will usually be the filing of his answer, al-
though defendants often demur or make other motions before answering a complaint. Insofar as
concerns this Note's proposal, however, there is no basis for distinguishing demurrers and prelimi-
nary motions from an answer. Conceptually, both represent the defendant's resort to a judicial
body, rather than arbitration, for resolution of some issue in the dispute, even if only a procedural
issue such as venue or the sufficiency of the plaintiffs prima facie case is raised. From a policy
standpoint, as much delay and expense can result from a succession of demurrers and other pre-
answer motions as from postanswer delaying tactics. Cf. Comment, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 285, 287-88
(1947) (for arbitration policy reasons, a motion to dismiss should be treated the same as an answer
and joining on the merits).
Although the standard for waiver of the right to compel arbitration is amenable to codifica-
tion, in most jurisdictions the waiver standard has remained a judge-made rule. See, e.g., text
accompanying notes 109-23 (the reasonableness standard), 124.41 (the actual litigation standard),
142-71 (the prejudice standard).
It should be noted further that parties to an arbitration agreement can avoid the need to
resort to the courts for adjudication of a waiver issue by including in their agreement a standard
for determining when the agreement has been waived.
228. See Gunderson v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. App. 3d 138, 144, 120 Cal. Rptr. 35, 38 (1975),
disapproved, Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge, Highway and Transp. Dist., 23 Cal. 3d 180, 188, 588
P.2d 1261, 1265, 151 Cal. Rptr. 837, 841 (1979); text accompanying note Ill supra. Put see note
226 supra.
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inconsistency with an intention to arbitrate.22 9
A. THE PLAINTIFF STANDARD: FILING SUIT
Under this Note's proposal, a plaintiff who files suit over an arbitrable
contractual issue is deemed to have waived his arbitration rights under
the agreement. It may be argued that this proposal is unnecessarily
harsh in that it forces a plaintiff to choose his dispute resolution forum
before he may be ready to do so. Attorneys often file suit in a dispute
as a matter of course to preserve litigation rights that might otherwise
expire because of a statute of limitations. Such complaints are often
not immediately served, but are held in reserve in the event that settle-
ment or arbitration efforts fail. This argument suggests that a later pro-
cedural event, such as service of the complaint or defendant's joining
issue on the merits in his answer, would be a more appropriate test for
waiver.
Such later tests would, however, entail sigiificant problems. Be-
cause a policy goal of arbitration is the reduction of litigation,230 it is
hardly a persuasive argument against the proposal that it would pre-
vent the routine filing of complaints to toll a statute of limitations and
preserve litigation rights.23' It is not clear why a plaintiff should be
able to preserve both litigation and arbitration rights during the period
before service of defendant's answer; filing suit certainly evidences an
intention not to rely for redress on the agreement to arbitrate. Even if a
plaintiff does intend to rely on arbitration, filing such a complaint
amounts to an attempt to preserve two inconsistent remedies.232 When
a prospective plaintiff is aware of his arbitration rights, he should be
required to choose between arbitration and litigation as the forum for
229. Under the proposal then, mere pleading of an arbitration agreement in an answer will
not save the right to compel arbitration; such right would have to be affirmatively asserted by
motion to be saved. See text accompanying notes 101-03 supra.
230. See text accompanying notes 6, 64, 91 supra.
231. The primary purpose of statutes of limitations is to prevent the prosecution of actions
based on old and unreliable evidence. See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538,
554 (1974). Plaintiff's filing of a complaint that is not immediately served, to preserve litigation
rights, is really a subtle method of extending the statutory period while the plaintiff explores alter-
native settlement or arbitration options. The diligent and timely plaintiff has ample time to weigh
litigation advantages against those of settlement and arbitration. That this Note's proposal penal-
izes dilatory plaintiffs, who take action at the end of the statutory period, is more a criticism of
statutes of limitations than it is of the proposal to make filing suit a test for waiver of the right to
compel arbitration.
232. Cf. S. WILLISTON & G. THOMPSON, supra note 212, § 684, at 568 (contract law does not
permit the election of two inconsistent remedies); see text accompanying notes 212-18 supra.
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resolving his grievances.233
B. THE DEFENDANT STANDARD: FAILING TO MOVE TO COMPEL
ARBITRATION IN ONE'S INITIAL COURT APPEARANCE
Under this Note's proposal, a party to an arbitration agreement who is
named as a defendant in an action brought in violation of the agree-
ment must move to compel arbitration at the same time that he re-
sponds to the action by appearing in court, or else be held to have
waived his arbitration rights. An alternative would be to require the
motion to be made within a specified number of days following the
defendant's being served with the plaintiff's lawsuit. The problem with
such a standard is that to be effective, such a period would have to be
relatively short-less than a month234-- and in the early stages of a law-
suit, procedural events are far more significant than mere passage of
235time.
The proposed defendant standard parallels that for the plaintiff. If
the defendant wishes to rely on the arbitration agreement, he must do
so without delay; there is generally no reason to give a defendant more
time to make a motion to compel arbitration than he is given to re-
spond to a plaintiff's complaint.236 A defendant has the answer period
in which to weigh, along with other alternatives, the advantages of ar-
bitration as opposed to litigation. Permitting the defendant any signifi-
cant period of delay is likely to disadvantage the plaintiff regardless of
which forum is ultimately chosen.237
233. The assertion here is that a plaintiff who files suit may later wish to arbitrate, and that
this Note's proposal interferes with the option to arbitrate at a later date. The proposal, however,
takes from the plaintiff neither his arbitration rights nor his opportunity to attempt to shift the
dispute to a judicial forum; it merely requires him to do one or the other at the outset of the
dispute.
234. If any more than a month is allotted, the standard would begin to codify the problems it
is intended to resolve by allowing parties to equivocate for a significant period of time on the
choice between arbitration and litigation.
235. For example, it is not nearly so important that the defendant may have let 10 or 20 days
pass from the filing of the plaintiff's suit without moving to compel arbitration, as it is that he has
answered the suit without so moving. Any given time period would be arbitrary; it makes much
more sense to tie the deadline for moving to compel arbitration to a significant procedural event,
such as the defendant's first court appearance. Moreover, rigid time constraints require exceptions
for the inevitable deserving party who has failed to meet them.
236. A possible exception to this general proposition may arise in the event of surprise of the
plaintiff by the defendant's making of the motion to compel arbitration. The plaintiff is unlikely
to be truly "surprised," however, at such a motion because he is probably aware that his original
suit is in contravention of the arbitration agreement.
237. See text accompanying notes 84-89 supra.
Criticism of a strict defendant standard for waiver on the basis that it creates hardships for
the defendant in choosing a forum borders on the trivial. When the defendant is uncertain as to
1546
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C. JUSTIFICATION OF THE PROPOSED STANDARDS
1. The Case for Objective Standards
Professor Corbin writes that the purpose of the law of contracts is to
protect, insofar as possible, the reasonable expectations of the parties to
a contract.238 Contract law has long abandoned interpretative theories
based on subjective intent in favor of those based on the reasonable
implications of a party's conduct;239 the actual subjective beliefs of a
party to a contract are not accorded legal consequence if they are deter-
mined to be unreasonable.24' Regardless of a party's subjective intent
as to his right to compel arbitration, therefore, a court can deem that
right to have been waived if the party's objective acts or omissions do
not reasonably indicate a desire to preserve that right. This Note's pro-
posal promotes clarity, consistency, and ease of proof: It is far easier to
prove that the plaintiff has filed a complaint in a judicial forum, or that
the defendant has failed to make a motion concurrent with his initial
court appearance than it is to show that a party subjectively intended to
relinquish the right to compel arbitration.24 This Note argues, in part,
the better forum, he need only choose arbitration. The plaintiff has already manifested his prefer-
ence for litigation by filing suit in a judicial forum. Therefore, should the defendant decide at a
later date that litigation would be more advantageous, he will likely receive the plaintiff's support
in seeking change to a judicial forum. While the delay and waste of resources that such tactics
would entail are hardly to be applauded, they do illustrate that a defendant is not disadvantaged
by a strict time constraint on his choice of forum.
238. 1 A. CORBIN, suYpra note 8, § 1, at 1-2. Professor Corbin also writes:
The law does not attempt the realization of every expectation that has been induced
by a promise; the expectation must be a reasonable one. Under no system of law that has
ever existed are all promises enforceable. The expectation must be one that most people
would have; and the promise must be one that most people would perform.
Id. at 2.
239. Canadian Nat'l Ry. v. George M. Jones Co., 27 F.2d 240, 242 (6th Cir. 1928); Brant v.
California Dairies, 4 Cal. 2d 128, 133, 48 P.2d 13, 16 (1935); Houghton v. Kerr Glass Mfg. Corp.,
261 Cal. App. 2d 530, 537, 68 Cal. Rptr. 43, 48 (1968); e.g., Gateway Co. v. Charlotte Theatres,
Inc., 297 F.2d 483, 484-85 (Ist Cir. 1961). As early as 1881, Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote that,
"The law has nothing to do with the actual state of the parties' minds. In contract, as elsewhere, it
must go by externals, and judge parties by their conduct." O.W. HOLMES, supra note 26, at 242.
See also id. at 40-43 (the criminal law is not concerned with the actual blameworthiness of the
defendant, but with his blameworthiness as compared with the average, reasonable, and prudent
man). The reason for the shift to objectivity was that a person's subjective state of mind is so
difficult to prove that the parties must usually resort to objective criteria anyway:
[T]he actual intent of the one party and the actual understanding of the other are matters
of fact that may be difficult of proof; and in the process of making this proof, the expres-
sions that would be used and the meanings that would be given by other men may be
decisive.
I A. CORBIN, supra note 8, § 106, at 157 (emphasis added).
240. Bronaugh, 4greement, Mistake, and Objectivity in the Bargain Theory of Contract, 18
WM. & MARY L. REV. 213, 243-44 (1976).
241. See id. at 244. Specific and detailed records exist to show the former, whereas findings of
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that current standards of waiver approximate more closely the latter
rather than the former, with the resulting inconsistency and lack of
clarity that have largely frustrated the policy goals of arbitration.2 42
The strongest argument against objective standards is that, be-
cause such standards involve little inquiry into the waiving party's ac-
tual state of mind regarding relinquishment of arbitration rights, they
can result in inadvertent waiver of such rights by a party genuinely
unaware of his contractual right to arbitrate, or of the legal standard
for waiver of such right. For example, a party may sign a contract
containing an arbitration agreement without noticing, reading, and un-
derstanding the agreement.2 43 Or, a party may be aware of his right to
compel arbitration but ignorant of the legal standard of waiver, L e.,
that he waives his arbitration rights by filing suit or by appearing in
response to a suit without also moving to compel arbitration.
Because they are unaware of their arbitration rights or the applica-
ble waiver standard, such parties will assent to litigation when an un-
resolvable contractual dispute arises, either by filing suit themselves as
plaintiffs or by appearing in court in answer to a suit, without moving
for arbitration, as defendants. By so doing, they will waive, under this
Note's proposal, their right to compel arbitration. 2 " If arbitration
would have been a more favorable dispute resolution mechanism to
such a waiving party than litigation, the party has unwittingly damaged
itself. Under a subjective standard, this presumably would not happen
because the party's actual state of mind is considered in deciding
whether waiver has occurred.
It must be remembered that the general standard for contractual
waiver is not purely subjective. Rather, it is an objective evaluation of
the reasonable implications of a party's actions, such actions being
taken as evidence of the party's actual state of mind.2 45 The issue,
therefore, is not whether a party is genuinely ignorant of his right to
unreasonableness or prejudice vary according to the facts. The findings ultimately depend on the
whims of the trier of fact in deciding which characterization of the facts-the plaintiff's, the de-
fendant's, or his (their, if ajury) own-he (they) will accept as true. See text accompanying notes
176-78 supra. Although the actual litigation standard has significant deficiencies, see text accom-
panying notes 197-203 supra, it does not have the inherent uncertainty of an abstract concept such
as unreasonableness or prejudice. It will take repeated litigation, however, before the California
courts will be able to define adequately when a case has been "actually litigated." See note 198
supra.
242. See text accompanying notes 180-85 supra.
243. Or, having read and understood the agreement, the party may have simply forgotten it.
244. See text accompanying notes 226-27 supra.
245. See text accompanying note 209 supra.
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compel arbitration or the legal standard of waiver, but whether he is
reasonably ignorant. If such ignorance is not reasonable, then a party's
failure to compel arbitration can be construed as evidence of his intent
to knowingly and voluntarily relinquish contractual rights to arbitra-
tion.2 46
This Note argues that it is rarely, if ever, reasonable for a party to
be unaware of his contractual right to arbitrate or the legal standard of
waiver under circumstances that would implicate this Note's proposed
standards for waiver of the right to compel arbitration. An agreement
to arbitrate must be in writing to be enforceable.247 In order for a party
to remain ignorant of his right to arbitrate, and to waive inadvertently
that right by filing or answering a suit in a judicial forum, both the
party and his attorney must have failed to read the contractual docu-
ment or otherwise failed to discover the arbitration agreement. 248
While such dual omissions undoubtedly occur, it certainly is not rea-
sonable for a party and his attorney to file or answer a suit based on a
contract that neither has read.
It is a well established principle of traditional contract law that a
party to a contract is held to have constructive knowledge of each part
of the written instrument that he signs.249 Indeed, the California courts
have generally held that failure to read a contractual agreement to arbi-
trate is not a defense to the enforceability of the agreement. 25 ° This
Note's proposal is thus consistent with this line of cases. That a party
may unknowingly waive his right to compel arbitration merely reflects
the fundamental notion that to receive the benefit of a contractual pro-
vision, a party must make himself aware of it when he has a reasonable
opportunity to do so. When the contract is in writing, as are all en-
246. See notes 210-11 and accompanying text supra.
247. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.2 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
248. Although agreements to arbitrate occasionally are documents separate from the substan-
tive contractual agreement, most such agreements are a separate clause in the substantive contract.
249. Under this principle, a party is held to have read and understood every provision of the
contract that he has signed, regardless of whether he has actually done so. Burt v. Olive Growers
Ass'n, 175 Cal. 668, 675, 166 P. 993, 996 (1917); Maw v. McAlister, 252 S.C. 280, 284-85, 166
S.E.2d 203, 204-05 (1969); Calamari, Duty to Read-A Changing Concept, 43 FORDHAM L. REV.
341, 341-42 (1974).
250. E.g., Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps., 17 Cal. 3d 699, 710, 552 P.2d 1178, 1185, 131
Cal. Rptr. 882, 889 (1976); N.A.M.E.S. v. Singer, 90 Cal. App. 3d 653, 655, 153 Cal. Rptr. 472, 473
(1979); Vernon v. Drexel Burnham & Co., 52 Cal. App. 3d 706, 125 Cal. Rptr. 147 (1975); Fede-
rico v. Frick, 3 Cal. App. 3d 872, 875, 84 Cal. Rptr. 74, 75 (1970). But see Windsor Mills, Inc. v.
Collins & Aikmen Corp., 25 Cal. App. 3d 987, 992-94, 101 Cal. Rptr. 347, 350-51 (1972) (party
held not responsible for failing to read, and thus not bound by, an arbitration agreement incon-
spicuously printed on the back of an apparently noncontractual document).
1979] 1549
1550 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:1513
forceable agreements to arbitrate, the party has a duty to read it, and he
may be held legally responsible for the contents.25'
This Note also argues that it is not an excuse that a party was
ignorant of the legal standard of waiver. Putting aside the merits of the
common law presumption that every person knows the law,25 2 it is in-
disputable that every attorney is expected to know the law. Rarely is
the legal knowledge of an attorney immaterial to the resolution of the
substantive issues in a case. When a party is prejudiced by a mistake of
his attorney, as when arbitration rights are waived because of the attor-
ney's ignorance of the legal standard of waiver, the party might have an
251. There is a growing feeling among judges and commentators that in those standard form
contractual transactions in which one of the parties has such a distinct lack of bargaining power
and is presented with a long and complex contractual instrument authored by the other party, it is
not good policy to automatically hold such a party to knowledge of the instrument that he signs.
E.., Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps., 17 Cal. 3d 699, 710, 552 P.2d 1178, 1185, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 882, 889 (1976); Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 63 Cal. App. 3d 345, 357-62, 133 Cal. Rptr.
775, 783-87 (1976); Calamari, supra note 249, at 351-58; Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and
Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REv. 529, 529-33 (1971). To hold a party
in such a standard form transaction to knowledge and understanding of all contractual provisions
contained in the form assumes a level of diligence and sophistication that most consumers proba-
bly lack. This suggests that, at least in those situations involving contracts of adhesion where one
party is unaware of his arbitration rights, the strict objective standard of waiver proposed by this
Note should not apply. That a contract clause is adhesive, however, does not necessarily absolve a
weaker party from imputed knowledge and understanding of the contractual terms; it merely sug-
gests that the dominant party should be estopped from enforcing terms that are patently unfair,
and of which the weaker party could not reasonably have been expected to be aware at the time of
contracting. When a party unknowingly waives, under this Note's proposal, his right to compel
arbitration, and is damaged by such waiver, see text accompanying and following note 244 supra,
such party would want to preserve the agreement to arbitrate once he becomes aware of it, not
invalidate it. This type of waiver of arbitration is thus distinguishable from the growing number
of contracts that are being invalidated on theories of adhesion. The former seeks to retain the
validity of a contractual term, whereas the latter operates to invalidate contractual terms. If the
weaker party to an adhesion contract nevertheless wishes to enforce a contractual term, such as an
agreement to arbitrate, it follows a fortiori that such term must be considered as being fair to the
weaker party. The unfairness of other terms notwithstanding, no more reason exists to absolve the
weaker party from knowledge of a fair nonadhesive term than exists to absolve parties of equal
bargaining power from knowledge of the provisions of their contract. This Note's proposal, there-
fore, should also apply to adhesion contracts.
It should be noted that a party's knowledge of his arbitration rights is likely to be at issue in
the consumer setting-where one party of superior knowledge and experience offers a product or
service to the public at large by means of a standard form contract, e.g., prepaid medical plans
such as the Kaiser Health Plan. In the commercial setting, such as a sale of goods from a manu-
facturer to a wholesaler, the parties are usually represented by attorneys and the terms of the
contract are generally the result of extensive negotiation. The arbitration agreement itself is likely
to be the subject of substantial discussion. Thus, rarely could a party to a commercial contract, as
opposed to a consumer contract, assert a genuine lack of knowledge of arbitration rights. Furnish,
Arbitration and Long-Term Commercial Agreements, 26 AM. J. COMP. L. 123, 123 (Supp. 1978);
see Henderson, supra note 3, at 987-88.
252. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW § 47, at 362-65 (1972).
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action for malpractice against the attorney, but he is still subject to the
law, and not excused from conforming to it.253
Because it is not reasonable for a party to an agreement to arbi-
trate either to be unaware of the existence of such an agreement or of
the legal standard for waiver, objective standards will not create injus-
tice even when a party unknowingly waives his right to compel arbitra-
tion. When one also considers the inherent difficulties of meeting a
subjective or abstract test such as reasonableness or prejudice, it be-
comes apparent that objective standards are most appropriate as the
standards for waiver of the right to compel arbitration.25 4
2. Correction of Defciencies in Present Standards of Waiver
a. Frustration ofpolicy goals: The proposal requires that arbitra-
tion be invoked quickly and early in a dispute to facilitate the speedy
entry of cases into the arbitration process. It precludes plaintiffs from
testing the litigation waters before deciding to arbitrate. Likewise, a
defendant party to an arbitration agreement who wishes to assert arbi-
tration in response to litigation must do so quickly; delay beyond the
initial appearance in moving to compel arbitration results in surrender
of that right. This eliminates the opportunity, existent under current
waiver standards, for a defendant to use the right to compel arbitration
as a delaying tactic. 255 Because a defendant must exercise that right at
the outset of a dispute if he is to exercise it at all, a plaintiff will have to
endure the risks of delay only when he also receives the balancing ad-
vantages of litigation and trial.256 Plaintiffs are not left in the odd posi-
253. See I A. CORBIN, supra note 8, § 9, at 21 ("one may be 'bound' by a contract in ways that
he did not intend, foresee, or understand. The juristic effect (the resulting legal relations) of a
man's expressions in word or act may be very different from what he supposed it would be"); cf
Bronaugh, supra note 240, at 244 ("the possibility that one might be committed to certain unfore-
seen consequences of contracting occurs because one has placed oneself into an objective, institu-
tional structure by the exercise of that power of acceptance that obligates the offeror").
It should be noted that, even where a party has unknowingly or unintentionally waived his
right to compel arbitration, only rarely will such waiver be to his disadvantage. The arbitration
provision is presumably included in the contract because the parties feel that it will usually be
more advantageous to arbitrate than litigate. Should the waiving party subsequently wish to arbi-
trate, he would conform to the original design of the parties in including an agreement to arbitrate
in the first place, and thus is likely to find support from the other party in choosing an arbitration
forum. This is particularly the case in a standard form transaction, when the waiving party was
not the author of the form. But see note 217 supra.
254. Cf. C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 342, at 802-06 (2d ed.
1972) (reason for formulation of presumptions in the law is that experience has proven that they
are usually true). See also B. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 30-34 (1961).
255. See text accompanying notes 191-206 supra.
256. Some plaintiffs would undoubtedly be willing to undergo the risks of litigation if they
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tion of having to force arbitration by proceeding with litigation in order
to obtain an adjudication of their claim.
At least as important, the proposal generates no new inequities for
either party. Plaintiffs have virtually the full period of the applicable
statute of limitations to determine their preferred forum. Defendants
have the normal period allowed for filing an answer,257 which can be
extended upon showing of good cause.258 Neither party is allowed to
gain tactical advantage by equivocation, delay, or otherwise misleading
conduct as permitted under current law. When a party reasonably
lacks knowledge of his arbitration rights, such as in a standard form or
adhesion contract situation, arbitration rights that were inadvertently
ignored by such party may be restored at the trial judge's discretion. 259
The proposal also discourages litigation, another important policy
goal of arbitration,260 in two ways. First, it greatly diminishes uncer-
tainty over the proper forum for resolving a dispute. "Filing suit in a
judicial forum" and "failing to make a motion to compel in one's an-
swer" are more defined and predictable standards than "reasonableness
of delay," "actual litigation," or "prejudice." Disagreements over the
waiver issue, therefore, are more likely to be settled, if they arise at all,
rather than litigated because the probable winner of the disagreement
will be clear at the outset. Second, the proposal makes merely filing a
suit more costly because it amounts to sacrifice of arbitration rights.
Plaintiffs will likely give more careful consideration to arbitration
before resorting to litigation.
Finally, the proposal decreases the expense of arbitration by elimi-
nating the personal and social waste that occurs when scarce legal and
judicial resources are expended in preparing a suit for trial, only to
have it sent to arbitration.2 6'
were to be assured of receiving its benefits-such as binding precedent, generally larger damage
awards, see notes 72, 74-76, 195, 202 and accompanying text supra-as well, rather than being
forced into arbitration at the eleventh hour before trial.
257. Under the federal rules, a defendant generally has 20 days from the time the complaint is
served on him in which to answer it. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a). In California, the defendant generally
has 30 days. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 412.20(a)(3) (West 1973).
258. FED. R. Civ. P. 6(b); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1054 (West 1973). Generally, what consti-
tutes "good cause" is left to the discretion of the trial judge. See, e.g., In re Buckhingham Super
Mkts., Inc., 534 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
259. See text accompanying notes 242-54 supra.
260. See text accompanying notes 83-92 supra.
261. See text accompanying notes 242-54 supra. Because the proposal dictates waiver of arbi-
tration rights in situations that do not constitute waiver under present law, it arguably results in
the litigation of cases that would otherwise be arbitrated, and, therefore, generates social costs by
adding to the caseload of the courts. This increased litigation is more than balanced, however, by
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b. Inconsistency with the concept of contractual waiver: Current
law makes the wrong judgment about the legal implications of a party's
subjective intent when waiver of the right to compel arbitration is at
issue. Under all three standards-reasonableness, prejudice, and ac-
tual litigation-a party can file suit in a judicial forum or significantly
delay making a motion to compel arbitration, either of which implies
an intention to disregard arbitration rights, without actually waiving
the right to compel arbitration.262 The choice between arbitration and
litigation is clear and relevant the moment that a dispute arises under a
contract with an arbitration agreement; there is no legitimate reason for
either party to wander down the path of litigation before proceeding to
arbitration. An objective view of the conduct of parties to an arbitra-
tion agreement suggests that failure to move to compel arbitration at
the outset of a contractual dispute reasonably implies relinquishment
of arbitration rights. The proposal makes the proper judgment by re-
quiring that a court find waiver of the right to compel arbitration in
such circumstances.
CONCLUSION
Present standards of waiver of the right to compel arbitration create
substantial problems. They subvert the policy goals of arbitration by
increasing litigation, by increasing the delay and expense of arbitration,
and by rewarding dilatory and misleading conduct by parties to an
agreement to arbitrate. They are also inconsistent with general con-
tract waiver law. These problems are best solved by imposition of a
clear standard that forces a party to choose between arbitration and
litigation at the outset of an arbitrable dispute. Under this Note's pro-
posal, a plaintiff party to an arbitration agreement will be held to have
waived his right to compel arbitration if he files suit over an arbitrable
issue in a judicial forum; a defendant party waives his arbitration rights
by failing to make a motion to compel arbitration at the time he makes
his initial court appearance in response to the plaintiff's suit. This pro-
posal corrects the deficiencies of current arbitration law by ensuring
procedural certainty at the beginning of a dispute.
Although arbitration has long been an alternative to judicial reso-
lution of disputes, it has taken on increased importance in an era in
which the resources of our traditional legal system are seriously taxed
the decrease in litigation that will come because of the clarity and certainty that the proposal
injects into the question of whether a party has waived his right to compel arbitration.
262. See text accompanying notes 207-21 supra.
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by the demands of vastly increased litigation. By providing a faster,
cheaper, and more adaptable forum for dispute resolution, arbitration
helps relieve congestion in the court system and provides for fair adju-
dication of individual disputes. The courts must take care to safeguard
the advantages of the arbitration forum, and avoid injecting into the
arbitration process the disadvantages of litigation if arbitration is to
remain a truly viable alternative to litigation.
Frederick Mark Gedicks
